



Evaluation of Indianapolis Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, Final Report

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) to support law enforcement in combating violent gang crime and promoting prevention efforts that discouraged gang involvement. The initiative grew out of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a nationwide program aimed at reducing gun and gang crime through support of existing local programs. DOJ dedicated \$30 million in grant funding to support new and expanded anti-gang prevention and enforcement efforts through CAGI. DOJ initially provided anti-gang resources to six cities. In April 2007, CAGI was expanded to include four additional sites, including Indianapolis, Indiana. CAGI provided \$2.5 million in targeted grant funding for a three-year period to each selected city to implement a three-pronged strategy to reduce gang involvement and crime, which included initiatives in law enforcement, prevention/intervention, and reentry. Approximately \$1 million was dedicated to support comprehensive gang prevention and intervention efforts with youth. An additional \$1 million was targeted to law enforcement and \$500,000 to support reentry initiatives.

In July 2008, the Center for Criminal Justice Research (CCJR), part of the Indiana University Public Policy Institute, was engaged to serve as the research partner for CAGI. Throughout the program, CCJR provided feedback on implementation, input on data collection, and gathered a considerable amount of information for evaluating law enforcement, prevention/intervention, and reentry activities. This report summarizes the history of the grant and expenditures, recaps CAGI research activities undertaken in 2009 and 2010, and discusses research activities across all three areas in 2011 and 2012, concluding with lessons learned during the entire grant period.¹ Summaries of earlier findings and excerpts are drawn directly from previously produced reports, including the following:

- *Evaluation of Indianapolis Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Law Enforcement Activities, 2009-2010*
- *Evaluation of Indianapolis Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Prevention/Intervention Programming, 2009-2010*
- *Evaluation of Indianapolis Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Reentry Program, 2009-2010*

The above three publications are referred to throughout this report as law enforcement, prevention/intervention, and reentry reports.

Law Enforcement Activities

CCJR researchers collected extensive information to evaluate CAGI law enforcement (LE) initiatives from 2009 through 2011. For 2009 and 2010, CAGI LE activities mainly focused on two open air drug market initiatives (OAI). The goal of the CCJR evaluation was to document the activities of the 2009 and 2010 OAI and 2011 LE activities and to evaluate the impact of CAGI LE activities on crime in the area. The CAGI evaluation showed the following:

Law enforcement findings

1. In 2009, there were 219 individuals arrested on 305 charges according to CAGI-related Tiburon reports. More than one-third of these charges (120) were for drug trafficking or possession. In 2010, 29 individuals were arrested on 63 charges. Nearly-two thirds of the charges at arrest were for drug trafficking or possession. Several additional arrests are likely based on archived drug buys being used to build cases.
2. More than half (54 of 111) of charges forwarded to the CAGI prosecutor for review involved drug possession or trafficking (most often at the felony level).
3. For CAGI defendants arrested in 2009, there were 22 listed as prosecuted. Twenty of the 22 cases resulted in conviction. The remaining two cases were individuals still wanted by police. The large majority of these cases involved felony drug trafficking. Of the 20 cases forwarded to the CAGI prosecutor with a 2010 arrest data, 19 were convicted (nearly all on dealing cocaine or heroin charges). One defendant was listed as wanted by police.
4. Only one of 315 CAGI Tiburon reports in 2009 and 2010 mentioned the word gang. Of 96 cases forwarded to the CAGI prosecutor in 2009, nearly 20 percent (19 individuals) were known or suspected gang members. Examination of the IMPD relational database showed that in 2010, 11 of 32 arrestees tracked there were suspected or confirmed gang members.
5. Impact analysis of 2009 CAGI OAI activities in three beat areas (NE, NW, SW) showed statistically significant reductions in reported Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) property and violent crime in the NE target area, reductions in UCR violent crimes in the SW target area, and no significant impact on

¹CCJR also conducted an evaluation of a PSN project that was partially funded by the CAGI grant. The evaluation of TriggerPro was based on a comparison of two forensic methods—fingerprinting firearms compared to collecting touch DNA samples with TriggerPro gun swabs. The report, *The TriggerPro Gun Swab Evaluation: Comparing the Use of a Touch DNA Collection Technique to Firearm Fingerprinting*, was produced in June 2010. Results of this evaluation are not included in this report.



reported UCR crimes in the NW target area. Such results should be interpreted with caution due to the short post-intervention period of observation and the limited measures of reported crime available.

6. In 2011 in SW District, 20 individuals were arrested through narcotics investigations using \$25,000 in CAGI funding. Seventeen of these 20 individuals were known gang members or had direct ties to one of two area gangs. Evidence of a gang connection to 2011 SW District activities was perhaps strongest of any CAGI-funded initiatives. This activity appeared to be highly efficient and effective.
7. In 2011 in NE District, 250 individuals were arrested on 356 charges, most often through directed patrol activities envisioned within the grant. A major gang investigation netted 19 arrests of suspected gang members and appears to have led to information relating to several other serious crimes.
8. The activities in NE District in 2011 appeared to be multi-faceted and cutting edge. For example, an initiative to increase firearm seizures and successful prosecutions of gun crimes appears to have been successful. At least 30 officers were trained using CAGI funding and there was an increase in the number of firearms seized and a decrease in the number of cases that could not be successfully prosecuted due to officer evidence issues. This initiative led to the development of a new firearms investigation protocol, piloted in NE District and scheduled for city-wide implementation.

Prevention/Intervention Activities

CCJR researchers collected extensive information to evaluate CAGI prevention/intervention initiatives between 2009 and 2010. During this period, activities primarily focused on prevention/intervention programming services provided by six local organizations. From November 2010 through March 2012, prevention/intervention program activities were exclusively concentrated on the provision of five conferences for members of the community (gang summits). The goal of these events was providing education, raising awareness of the gang issue, and informing the public of available resources to address the problem.

Prevention/intervention findings, 2009-2010

The findings noted below are the result of research activities focused on 2009-2010 prevention/intervention activities. Given that completion rates were low for both provider and participant data, confidence in findings reported here should be tempered. As detailed more fully in the prevention/intervention report, there were substantial program implementation and data collection issues that limit the ability to make strong inferences about the impact of prevention/intervention programming. The available evidence of program effectiveness was mixed, with positive results highlighted below:

1. Matched provider data suggested consistent reductions in problematic behaviors and attitudes (at least that the providers were aware of). Reported gang-risk indicators with the sharpest declines following CAGI programming included skips school (31 percent reduction), *having been in physical fights* (26 percent decline), *associating with or being friends with gang members* (21 percent decrease), and *referring to known neighborhood gangs* (17 percent drop).
2. There were some (self-reported) indications of increased school participation and greater concern with obeying the law, less involvement in activities that could get participant youth in trouble, and reductions in the number reporting that friends had been arrested. .
3. For the 129 youth who responded to both the pre- and post-survey, there were statistically significant reductions in the percentage reporting that one or more of their friends had been arrested, suspended or expelled, or dropped out of school.
4. Overall, 323 youth (58 percent) were never arrested at any point prior to or subsequent to their involvement with the CAGI program. Some of these youth might have been arrested but for their involvement with CAGI programming, but the current data cannot quantify this effect.

Results from the 2009-2010 research findings that presented some concern with respect to program impact included the following:

1. The share of participants that indicated that at least one of their best friends was currently or had been a member of a gang rose from 34 percent to 39 percent by the end of CAGI programming.



2. There was an *increase* in the percentage (54 to 61 percent) of participants conveying that allegiance to friends was more important than obeying the law. Many youth reported little or no change in their attitudes about gangs.
3. When comparing arrest outcomes, there was a statistically significant seven percent increase in the overall number of youth arrested following the start of CAGI, compared with the two years pre-CAGI.
4. When comparing the percentage of crimes that were felonies, overall there was a statistically significant 1.7 percent increase in the number of felonies subsequent to the start of CAGI programming.

Prevention/intervention findings, gang summits, 2010-2012

1. Results from all five conferences indicate that the response from participants that completed the surveys was overwhelmingly positive, and a large majority of respondents from all five events would recommend the program to others.
2. Specific sessions that were offered at one or more of the five events included *Gangs: What do you need to know*, *Indianapolis Gang and Awareness Overview*, and *Online Social Networking*. A substantial majority of respondents from all conferences rated the sessions as useful to them.
3. Most respondents also indicated that their understanding and awareness of gangs increased, as did their comfort level with contacting community leaders, law enforcement, and local youth-serving agencies regarding gang-related matters.
4. A considerable share of respondents from all five events offered input regarding additional gang-related topics for future programs and perspectives on specific resources, including individual actions, needed to confront the issue of gangs in the community.

Reentry Activities

CCJR researchers collected extensive information to evaluate 2009-2010 CAGI Reentry initiatives. These initiatives covered the bulk of CAGI reentry activities. The goal of the CCJR reentry evaluation was to assess the impact of CAGI programming on offenders with gang affiliation or those considered at high risk of gang activity.

In 2011, the CAGI steering committee awarded a single grant for a transitional jobs program called Keys to Work (KTW). Such programs offer temporary, subsidized employment to those who lack work experience, training, or education. Jobs are typically designed for those with barriers to employment, such as substance abuse, homelessness, or a criminal record. As part of the program assessment, CCJR researchers established a data entry mechanism for KTW staff to provide de-identified individual participant information for analysis. Information gathered covered participant age, program status, gang risk indicators, types of service provision, employment status at program conclusion, and arrest during program participation.

Reentry findings, 2009-2010

The CAGI reentry program intended to provide services to assist approximately 100 formerly incarcerated individuals with ties to gangs, who were returning to targeted zip codes within Marion County from an Indiana state correctional facility, to refrain from criminal activity and avoid gang involvement. To aid in the assessment of this risk, CCJR researchers established a relevant comparison group through the assistance of the DOC. The key findings noted below are the result of CCJR research efforts on CAGI reentry initiatives focused on 2009-2010 activities:

1. The program served participants who either had a specific history of gang affiliation or were at high risk of gang involvement. Ninety percent of participants (62 out of 69) had a history of gang involvement, with specific gang affiliation provided, as well as numerous other indicators of gang risk.
2. Prior offenses indicated a broad criminal history among program participants covering drug, violent, and property crimes. A large share of CAGI participants (42 percent) had at least one conviction prior to the one for which they were currently on parole or probation.
3. Overall, 41 percent of participants (28 of 69) graduated from the CAGI program. Twenty-seven participants (39 percent) were terminated from the program. Nine participants were transferred to reentry court; three participants were transferred to alternate parole districts, and two withdrew following completion of required parole terms.
4. Based on information collected by CAGI staff from providers, 35 percent of all participants were reportedly employed at the conclusion of reentry program. Providers



indicated they were unaware of the employment status of approximately 20 percent of participants, and 45 percent were unemployed.

5. Although the raw percentages of arrests and convictions varied across the participant and comparison groups, there were no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of re-arrest or conviction. Thus, the two groups were statistically indistinguishable regardless of whether or not they participated in CAGI.
6. Seventy-eight percent (53 of 68) of CAGI participants had a new arrest. Among the comparison group, two-thirds (46 out of 69) were re-arrested between release from IDOC and the date of data collection. The most common types of new crimes that CAGI participants were arrested for were traffic violations (59 percent), disorderly conduct/resisting law enforcement (29 percent), possession of cocaine or narcotic (27 percent), felony battery (24 percent), and theft/receiving stolen parts (21 percent). The overall rate of felony arrests was nearly identical among comparison group individuals—55 percent.
7. A higher percentage of CAGI participants (35 percent) were convicted on felony charges than individuals from the comparison group (26 percent). Among CAGI participants, 13 (19 percent) were convicted at the misdemeanor level and 10 (15 percent) comparison group offenders were convicted at this level.

Reentry findings, Keys to Work, 2011-2012

1. Thirteen candidates were identified by KTW at program outset as eligible to fill seven available program spots. The program went on to serve eight individuals, all of whom were self-identified gang members. Nearly all participants received services for the full five-month term of CAGI-funded programming.
2. KTW staff reported that two of the eight participants were arrested during the time they received services (both for violations of conditions of parole or probation).
3. At the end of the grant period, six of the participants remained in the transitional job positions to which they had been assigned. One of the participants had secured full

time employment. KTW staff also reported that two of the six in transitional positions had been offered permanent positions.

4. Although the timeframe of the CAGI-supported program was relatively short, based on KTW reporting, the provider was able to offer a range of services to program participants and to assist most in acquiring new skills and gaining valuable work experience. Given the length of the project, it was not possible for CCJR to assess the long-term impact of KTW's programming on participants' employment outcomes or likelihood of recidivism.

Recommendations

The report also documents several important lessons learned from the implementation of the grant activities in the three areas—law enforcement, prevention/intervention, and reentry. These lessons led to the development of a number of recommendations for future programs.

The first recommendation pertains to all three program areas:

- Engage the research partner as early as possible in the research process, preferably as the grant proposal is being developed to allow for establishment of reliable data collection strategies prior to program implementation

Law enforcement

Operational issues for programs such as CAGI OAI

1. Develop a consistent definition of gang crime, train officers on this definition and ensure systematic gang data collection.
2. Train officers on when and how to fill out gang contact sheets and ensure that they do so when appropriate.
3. When initiatives involve drug market activity, focus additional efforts on generating cases for federal prosecution. This appears to have been more of a focus in 2011 activities than in the first two years of the grant.

Information collection and research issues

4. Rather than the involved officers specifying the district office, record the actual location of activity to improve the geographical assessment of programs such as CAGI-OAI.



If necessary to preserve confidentiality of investigatory information, the officer could list the district office in the incident report and maintain a separate log of locations of drug purchases that would remain confidential but could be provided to researchers.

5. Develop an accounting method to systematically show when officers are engaged in special projects such as CAGI (or PSN) and connect it to specific enforcement activity tracking for special projects. Tracking these special assignments across all IMPD districts and activities would simplify the determination of the impact of IMPD initiatives. This would also facilitate determination of which outcomes (such as arrests) were associated with which funding source. IMPD officers can be engaged in a variety of legitimate activities with more than one funding source. Parsing out the unique impact of various expenditures becomes impossible without connecting activities with the funding.
6. Develop electronic tracking of cases to reduce time and increase accuracy, as was partially done in 2010 and more effectively done in 2011. Systematically and regularly enter information into the database. Within these databases, it would be useful to track the nature of the assignment (and funding source if overtime). Officers should also be encouraged to systematically write explanatory notes that go beyond basic statistics. These notes provide context and highly useful details on the types of activities engaged in by officers, which are often difficult to discern from databases or Tiburon incident reports.
7. For data collection efforts that rely on law enforcement officers whose primary mission is not data collection, ensure data collection instruments are in place prior to the project start date and not onerous to collect. Automate data collection if possible. IMPD would benefit from developing a universal tracking tool for projects such as these which require documentation and evaluation of law enforcement activities, arrests, prosecutions, and crime rates. Collection of data in late 2010 and especially 2011 (both NE and SW districts) was greatly enhanced by having technologically savvy officers overseeing data collection and creation of data collection tools in advance.

Prevention/intervention and reentry

The recommendations for these two program areas were very similar and are presented together. With the exception of the gang summits that were offered between November 2010 and March 2012 and the transitional jobs program offered by KTW, all of the recommendations included below are based on research findings from 2009-2010 activities.

1. Ensure at the outset of programming that program parameters are defined to allow an adequate number of program candidates (youth or offenders) to meet eligibility requirements. The original parameters and means for identifying potential participants proved overly restrictive and not feasible. This resulted in a great deal of time and effort to expand and redefine eligibility.
2. Attempt to ensure as much continuity in provider and program staff as possible. Staff transitions are to a certain degree inevitable, but these changes posed a significant challenge to overall data collection efforts.
3. For data collection efforts that rely on providers to administer surveys and gather detailed participant-level information, methods need to be devised to hold programs accountable. This suggestion refers to both the submission and completeness of required data instruments.
4. Ensure that data collection procedures for proposed metrics in subgrantee applications are described fully and that proposed performance metrics are accurately reported in semi-annual and final subgrantee reports. Future programs that involve subgrantees would be well-served by requiring that any metrics proposed by subgrantees should include a data collection plan.
5. Begin procurement of all necessary data early. Bringing the research partner on early would allow for identification of relevant data and data collection planning from the outset.
6. Continue to sponsor events such as the five prevention/intervention gang summits that raise understanding and awareness of the gang issue.
7. With regard to 2011-2012 reentry activities, consider funding additional projects such as the KTW transitional jobs program.



COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-GANG INITIATIVE (CAGI) BACKGROUND

In many areas across the United States, gangs and gang-related activity remain a primary concern for law enforcement agencies and the public in general. According to results from the 2009 National Youth Gang Survey (NYGS) of law enforcement agencies, the number of jurisdictions with gang problems and the number of gangs rose over 20 percent between 2002 and 2009. Gang-related crime, in particular homicides, remains highly concentrated in most populated jurisdictions. The 2009 NYGS results show that 96 percent of all gang-related homicides recorded in 2009 occurred in larger cities and suburban counties (Egley & Howell, 2011). Over the last several years in Indianapolis, law enforcement officials report that gang-related incidents are on the rise (Ryckaert, 2006). In late 2009, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) officials indicated that 150 gang-related arrests had been made that year, compared with only seven in 2006. At that time, IMPD reported that over 300 different gangs were operating in Marion County (Ryckaert & Murray, 2009).

In early 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI). The program was designed to support law enforcement in combating violent gang crime, as well as promote prevention efforts that discouraged gang involvement. The initiative grew out of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). Begun in 2001, PSN is a nationwide program aimed at reducing gun and gang crime through support of existing local programs. PSN resources have been directed to a variety of uses; for instance, to hire new federal and state prosecutors, deter juvenile gun crime, develop and promote community outreach efforts, provide training, and support gang violence reduction strategies. With announcement of the CAGI program, DOJ dedicated \$30 million in grant funding to support new and expanded anti-gang prevention and enforcement efforts. The new funds were intended to allow local PSN task forces to combat gangs by building on the effective strategies and partnerships developed under PSN. In May 2006, DOJ provided anti-gang resources for prevention, enforcement, and offender reentry efforts to six sites across the nation. In April 2007, CAGI was expanded to include four additional sites, one of which was Indianapolis.² CAGI provided \$2.5 million in targeted grant funding for a three-year period to each of the ten sites to implement a three-pronged strategy in response to gangs, as summarized below (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006; 2008):

- **Law Enforcement** – The program made available approximately \$1 million in grants per community to help support

enforcement programs that focused law enforcement efforts on the most significant violent gang offenders.

- **Prevention** – Approximately \$1 million in grants was made available per community to support comprehensive prevention efforts focused on reducing youth-gang crime and violence by addressing the range of personal, family and community factors that contribute to juvenile delinquency and gang activity.
- **Prisoner Reentry** – Approximately \$500,000 was made available per community to create reentry assistance programs with faith-based and other community organizations that provided transitional housing, job readiness and placement assistance, and substance abuse and mental health treatment to prisoners re-entering society.

Through collaboration between the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Indiana, the City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute, a steering committee was formed to plan and execute activities for the three-pronged approach focusing on prevention, law enforcement, and reentry programs to diminish gang activity in Indianapolis. The CAGI Steering Committee was comprised of representatives from the Indianapolis Mayor's Office, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), the Marion County Prosecutor's Office, community leaders, and members of the faith community. Three subcommittees also were created to oversee the three initiatives (law enforcement, prevention/intervention, and reentry).

In July 2008, the Center for Criminal Justice Research (CCJR), part of the Indiana University Public Policy Institute, was engaged to serve as the research partner for CAGI. From the outset of the partnership, CCJR researchers actively participated with the CAGI Steering Committee and CAGI program staff in program implementation and, specifically, in providing input on how to handle challenges regarding implementation and data needs across the three areas of the initiative. CCJR made sustained efforts in all three areas to assist CAGI staff and providers in identifying and gathering necessary data for evaluation of the program. The following reports document the results from these efforts:

- *Evaluation of Indianapolis Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Law Enforcement Activities, 2009-2010*

²The 10 sites include Los Angeles, California; Tampa, Florida; Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Eastern District of Pennsylvania's 222 Corridor; Rochester, New York; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Indianapolis, Indiana; and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina.



- *Evaluation of Indianapolis Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Prevention/Intervention Programming, 2009-2010*
- *Evaluation of Indianapolis Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Reentry Program, 2009-2010*

The above three publications are referred to throughout this report as law enforcement, prevention/intervention, and reentry reports. Details about the process of the evaluations can be found in these reports.



FISCAL OVERVIEW

Table 1 includes an overview of CAGI grants under the three main initiatives—prevention/intervention, reentry, and law enforcement—by project year, grant number, subgrantee, award amount, funds expended, and percentage of total award expended. Awards to subgrantees across the three areas over the course of the program totaled \$2,356,630. Of that amount, roughly 81 percent (\$1,905,088) had been expended as of May 10, 2012. These figures only cover funds for CAGI programming and do not include expenses associated with grant administration, personnel contracts, or project evaluation/research funding. Of the \$2.4 million awarded to subgrantees, law enforcement-related awards accounted for approximately 44 percent (\$1,035,785) of overall grant dollars, prevention/intervention grants in the amount of \$798,188 represent roughly 34 percent of all program funds awarded, and reentry program awards made up 22 percent (\$522,657) of the subgrant dollars.

For prevention/intervention initiatives, the most grant dollars were awarded for two one-year cycles: September 30, 2008 through October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2009 through October 1, 2010. Six programs were awarded funding during the overall grant period. An ongoing source of funding under grant number #08-PG-000A has been used to support prevention/intervention activities in the form of five community gang summits held between November 2010 and March 2012. Excluding the gang summit funding, prevention/intervention awards ranged from \$30,000 to \$100,000. Of the total amount awarded (\$798,188), approximately 91 percent (\$727,806) had been expended as of May 10, 2012.

With regard to specific prevention/intervention grants, during the first one-year award period, a grant of \$69,500 was made to Christamore House with a subcontracted amount of \$19,500 for the Hawthorne Community Center (Hawthorne). Of the initial grant, approximately \$50,000 was drawn down. In the second award cycle, Christamore House was awarded \$60,000 of which nearly all was spent. While Hawthorne initially partnered as a subcontractor with Christamore House, in the 2009-2010 grant cycle, the organization was awarded a formal CAGI contract, for \$30,000, all of which was expended. Forest Manor expended all funds awarded (\$50,000) in the first year. The provider received an award of \$60,000 for the second year and drew down nearly all awarded funds for the grant cycle. The Indiana Juvenile Justice Task Force (IJJTF) was awarded \$98,618 for the first

year, 81 percent of which was expended by the end of the first contract period. In October 2009, the Steering Committee renewed IJJTF's grant for a lower amount of \$80,000 due to a reduction in program personnel. The initial NOAH award was for \$50,000 of which the provider expended nearly all funds. The CAGI Steering Committee renewed the provider's grant for \$80,000 (an increase of \$30,000) to support increasing the capacity of the program. The Peace Learning Center (PLC) was awarded a grant of \$100,000 during the first year, of which all funds were expended. In the second year, PLC's grant was renewed, but for \$80,000 as a result of reduced programming.

As with prevention/intervention, nearly all of the reentry grants were awarded for two one-year cycles: September 30, 2008 through October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2009 through October 1, 2010. The size of reentry grants ranged from \$20,000 for an award to support a clerk position in the Marion County Superior Court to \$80,750. Christamore House was awarded \$80,750 for the first year, and only expended two percent (\$1,335) prior to withdrawing from the program. Bethlehem House was also awarded \$80,750 and drew down \$13,725 (17 percent) of the award by the end of the first contract period. In October 2009, the Steering Committee renewed Bethlehem House's grant for \$80,750, which was completely expended. Forest Manor and its partners were awarded a grant of \$80,750 during the first year and nearly all (98 percent) of these funds were expended. In the second year, this provider's contract was renewed for \$80,750, with 78 percent (\$63,031) of the grant expended. Following CAGI staff transition in early 2010, the project contracted with Phelco Technologies to assist with designing a data entry tool for the collection of reentry program participant-level data, and the consultant expended all funds awarded. In the last year of the project, Keys to Work received an award of \$72,657 to fund a transitional jobs effort, of which all funds were spent.

Awards made to law enforcement initiatives ranged from \$25,000 to \$244,640. IMPD received the largest award for the first Open Air Initiative (OAI 1) and expended approximately 72 percent of available funds. A subgrant in the amount of \$84,085 was awarded to partially support CAGI-related prosecution activities of a Marion County deputy prosecutor. Of this amount, \$71,777 (85 percent) was expended. Two additional subgrants were awarded to the Marion County Prosecutor, one for a gang prosecutor in the amount of \$77,500 of which all allocated funds



were expended and a second for a school-based program (G-RIDE) for \$129,500. Forty percent of funds were spent on the latter grant. The project also awarded IMPD a grant for the Touch DNA program for \$80,000 of which 100 percent of allocated funds were drawn down. The second OAI grant amount was for \$221,139. The project expended \$172,186 which accounted for 78 per-

cent of allocated funds. In the last year of the project, two IMPD projects were funded. The 42nd Street Area Crime Initiative received \$173,921, 95 percent of which was expended. This award also included PSN funds to allow full funding of the NE side project. The Haughville and Locsville Initiative drew down nearly 100 percent of a \$25,000 award.

Table 1: Grants awarded and funds spent

Grant Number	Subgrantee	Awarded	Expended	Percent expended
PREVENTION/INTERVENTION				
2008-2009				
08-PG-003	Forest Manor Multi-Service Center	\$50,000	\$49,999	100.0%
08-PG-004	N.O.A.H., Inc.	\$50,000	\$48,208	96.4%
08-PG-005	Peace Learning Center	\$100,000	\$100,000	100.0%
08-PG-006	Indiana Juvenile Justice Task Force	\$98,618	\$79,812	80.9%
08-PG-007	Christamore House	\$69,500	\$49,152	70.7%
2009-2010				
09-PG-020	NOAH, Inc.	\$80,000	\$79,813	99.8%
09-PG-021	Indiana Juvenile Justice Task Force (IJJTF)	\$80,000	\$71,082	88.9%
09-PG-022	Peace Learning Center	\$80,000	\$80,000	100.0%
09-PG-023	Forest Manor Multi-Service Center	\$60,000	\$59,788	99.6%
09-PG-024	Christamore House	\$60,000	\$58,352	97.3%
09-PG-025	Hawthorne Social Service Association, Inc.	\$30,000	\$30,000	100.0%
2008-2012				
08-PG-000A	Training materials/supplies (gang summits)	\$40,070	\$21,601	53.9%
<i>Prevention/Intervention subtotal</i>		\$798,188	\$727,806	91.2%
REENTRY				
2008-2009				
08-PG-008	Forest Manor Multi-Service Center Inc.	\$80,750	\$78,749	97.5%
08-PG-009	Christamore House, Inc.	\$80,750	\$1,335	1.7%
08-PG-016	The Bethlehem House - Reentry	\$80,750	\$13,725	17.0%
2009-2010				
09-PG-018	Forest Manor Multi-Service Center	\$80,750	\$63,031	78.1%
09-PG-019	The Bethlehem House	\$80,750	\$80,750	100.0%
09-PG-026	Marion County Superior Court	\$20,000	\$20,000	100.0%
	Phelco Technologies, Inc.	\$26,250	\$26,250	100.0%
2011-2012				
11-PG-032	Keys to Work, Inc.	\$72,657	\$72,657	100.0%
<i>Reentry subtotal</i>		\$522,657	\$356,496	68.2%
LAW ENFORCEMENT				
2008-2009				
08-PG-010	Marion County Prosecutor's Office - Gang Prosecutor	\$77,500	\$77,500	100.0%
08-PG-012	Marion County Prosecutor - Open Air Initiative	\$84,085	\$71,777	85.4%
08-PG-013	IMPD - Open Air Initiative	\$244,640	\$177,189	72.4%
	Marion County Prosecutor - G-RIDE	\$129,500	\$52,280	40.4%
08-PG-015	IMPD - Touch DNA	\$80,000	\$80,000	100.0%
2009-2010				
09-PG-028	IMPD - Open Air Initiative II	\$221,139	\$172,186	77.9%
2011-2012				
11-PG-030	IMPD - 42nd Street Area Crime Initiative	\$173,921	\$164,997	94.9%
	IMPD - Haughville and Locsville Initiative	\$25,000	\$24,856	99.4%
<i>Law enforcement subtotal</i>		\$1,035,785	\$820,785	79.2%
Total		\$2,356,630	\$1,905,088	80.8%

Source: Indiana Criminal Justice Institute fiscal grant reporting

Note: Funds expended under prevention/intervention subgrant 08-PG-00A for gang summits are current as of May 10, 2012.



INDIANAPOLIS CAGI LAW ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES

In its proposal to DOJ (pages 10-15), the Law Enforcement Committee (LEC) proposed a five phase strategy for CAGI law enforcement activities which included the following:

1. Identification of the target area
2. Intelligence gathering
3. Identification of gangs and gang members within the target area
4. Aggressive law enforcement activities
5. Evaluation and adjustment of initial law enforcement efforts for effectiveness

The law enforcement target beats were a subset of the areas identified by the five CAGI zip codes used in targeting prevention/intervention and reentry activities. Upon selection of the target area, the LEC proposed to gather intelligence on gang activity and prioritize gangs and areas to be targeted with "street level law enforcement efforts, such as saturated patrols, within the target area." As outlined in the DOJ proposal (p. 13):

[I]mplementation of the law enforcement strategies will begin with intense surveillance and undercover work within the target area. Each participating agency will aggressively and proactively investigate their assigned targets. Federal, state, and local law enforcement partners will collaborate with state and federal prosecutors throughout those investigations with an eye toward prosecuting the most serious, readily provable offenses in either state or federal court. Law enforcement agencies will also collaborate with probation and parole officers to conduct probation/parole sweeps in the target area and execute search and arrest warrants in appropriate cases. Search and arrest warrants will also be executed in appropriate cases based on evidence gathered during proactive undercover investigations. Simultaneously with other law enforcement activities in Phase IV, officers will conduct significant saturation patrols to establish a visible presence in the targeted area and deter gang activity.

The LEC proposed to spend \$489,500 to implement the various law enforcement strategies and operations. The money was to be used for saturation and directed patrols, officer overtime, and undercover operations. In addition, funding was to be provided for materials, equipment, and investigative tools that would support law enforcement activities.

The LEC also set aside \$100,000 for additional Gang Prosecutor resources within the Marion County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO) to assist with prosecution of individuals arrested through CAGI law enforcement activities.

As noted in the DOJ proposal (p. 22):

Anticipated outcomes from the law enforcement efforts include the following:

- Reduce number of suspected gang-related crimes in Indianapolis / Marion County
- Develop gang contact sheets to identify suspected gang membership
- Locate the "breeding grounds" for the gang member recruitment
- Increase law enforcement in narcotics to eliminate the suspected source of gang financing
- Increase suspected gang conflict awareness within Indianapolis / Marion County schools through presentations to faculty and students by the IMPD Gang Unit and collaboration with the GREAT Program

Reduction in gang-related criminal offenses in the target area is the primary measure of success for all components.

- Number of combined homicides, aggravated assaults, and robberies that are considered gang-related

With regard to CAGI program staff to support law enforcement activities, a Grant Coordinator was hired in August 2008 and worked with CCJR researchers throughout the course of the project, facilitating data collection on the 2009 and 2010 open air drug market initiatives. Throughout the project but especially in 2011, CCJR personnel worked closely with IMPD supervisors overseeing CAGI subgrant implementation to collect relevant data. Because the underlying logics and mechanics of the 2009/2010 grants varied somewhat from 2011, this report discusses CAGI Initiatives for 2009 and 2010 together. Activities for 2011 are discussed separately below.

CAGI Open Air Drug Market Initiatives (OAI) 2009 and 2010

The 2009 OAI subgrant proposal described the anticipated law enforcement activities within the




10 CAGI target beats (NW21, NW24, NW33, SW11, SW12, NE21, NE22, NE23, NE24, and NE51) (see Map A). The proposal notes that much of the drug sales activity occurs in public spaces and is conducted by or supports criminal gangs. Law enforcement activities were proposed to reduce drug crime and thereby reduce the potential for drug market related violence and eliminate a major source of funds for gangs. The proposal identified the following metrics to measure the success of the project:

1. Increase in arrests for gang-related crimes including narcotics, firearms, and violent crimes
2. Increase in gang-related intelligence
3. Focused prosecutions in state and Federal courts
4. Positive increase in relationships with community residents

5. Decrease in general gang activity including open air drug sales, violent crimes, and graffiti

In 2010, CAGI law enforcement activities continued with a second OAI. The 2010 OAI proposal documented several areas of progress in the CAGI target enforcement areas as a result of the 2009 OAI activities, such as arrests and gang members identified. The 2010 CAGI OAI listed several target areas, some of which were beats and some of which were smaller areas. To simplify the visualization of the areas that were targeted, each smaller area was aggregated up to the entire beat. Map B shows the seven CAGI target beats for 2010 which include SW11 and SW12, and NE21, NE22, NE23, NE24, and NE51. Perhaps not coincidentally, these were the areas of highest concentrations of activity in 2009. These areas appeared to be much more concentrated than the 2009 approach and appeared to

Map A: CAGI law enforcement target beats, 2009



Target beats, 2009

1. NW21
2. NW24
3. NW33
4. SW11
5. SW12
6. NE21
7. NE22
8. NE23
9. NE24
10. NE51



take advantage of the knowledge gained from conducting the 2009 OAI. For example, rather than targeting entire areas, in some cases, the proposed enforcement would focus on businesses identified as supporting drug and gang activities or individuals identified in prior investigations. The proposal identified the following metrics to measure the success of the project, which were very similar to the 2009 metrics:

1. Increased awareness of gang-related crimes including narcotics, firearms, and violent crimes
2. Increase in gang-related intelligence
3. Focused prosecutions in state and Federal courts
4. Positive increase in relationships with community residents
5. Decrease in general gang activity including open air drug sales, violent crimes, and graffiti


Evaluation strategy

The goal of the CCJR OAI evaluation was to document the activities of the 2009 and 2010 OAI and to evaluate the impact of CAGI drug market enforcement activities on crime in the area for 2009 and 2010.

The proposed strategy for documenting 2009 and 2010 OAI activities (2011 is described separately below) included attempts to collect the following information:

- Gang members identified during OAI activities
- OAI related arrests
- OAI specific prosecutions generally and specific gang charges pursued
- OAI specific weapon and drug seizures, and assets forfeited

Map B: CAGI law enforcement target beats, 2010



Target beats, 2010

1. SW11
2. SW12
3. NE21
4. NE22
5. NE23
6. NE24
7. NE51



Data sources

The data used to document 2009–2010 OAI activities come from four main sources: IMPD Tiburon reports, the Marion County Gang Database, a relational database maintained by the IMPD for 2010 OAI activities, and data on prosecutions/convictions maintained by the MCPO. Additional background information was obtained through communications with IMPD, the MCPO, and interim reports on the project to the CAGI Steering Committee.

The major source of data for the 2009 and 2010 activities was the Tiburon incident reporting system. One limitation of the Tiburon system that posed a substantial challenge to data collection efforts is that most relevant information is placed into a single narrative field. This made cleaning the data and compilation of relevant information very time consuming. Nearly all information relating to 2009 and 2010 CAGI OAI activities comes from these Tiburon reports, unless otherwise noted.

Throughout the project, CCJR researchers worked closely with IMPD and CAGI staff to try to systematically collect comprehensive data on OAI initiatives. For 2009 and 2010, these efforts led to a large amount of data being available for analysis, which came mainly in the form of Tiburon incident reports. Attempts to move beyond existing IMPD tracking tools were less successful until later in the project (2010 and 2011). For example, in 2010 a database was developed to track the gang ties of arrestees, what led officers to be involved with a particular situation, and what resulted from the incident (e.g., new confidential informant, evidence leading to a search warrant, among other things). However, such activities are somewhat labor intensive and possibly as a result of this, the database was not as comprehensive as it might have been for 2010 (and not available for 2009). In 2011, information was gathered electronically and reporting seemed to be more systematic, as will be discussed further below.

2009 and 2010 open air drug market initiative (OAI) results

Each Tiburon report was geocoded by CCJR researchers in terms of latitude and longitude and assigned an IMPD beat. Table 2 shows the 2009 and 2010 Tiburon report activity generated by beat. In 2009, 225 reports were associated with CAGI activities and in 2010, 81 reports were generated. In 2009, CAGI target beats accounted for nearly half the reports generated. Some Tiburon reports were associated with CAGI OAI activities,

but documented activities outside the target beats. The reason for this is that criminals involved in gangs and drugs appear to move quite freely within the city of Indianapolis. Therefore, an investigation of drug activity in NE24 might lead to a search or arrest warrant being served elsewhere. From this perspective, the number of associated reports outside the target beats does not indicate a lack of focus on the part of the police but rather the complexity and fluidity of the crime and criminals being targeted. In 2010, 69 percent of Tiburon reports were located at a district office compared to only 8 percent in 2009. Follow up discussions with IMPD personnel indicate that the reason for this is that in 2010, much of the activities included archived drug purchases to develop larger cases. The locations for these purchases are recorded as the relevant district office address to avoid possible disclosure of vital case information.

Table 3 documents the types of activities in 2009 and 2010 Tiburon incident reports. It should be noted that this classification is entirely dependent on what the officer listed as the incident code. Therefore, a traffic stop involving an arrest and seizure of drugs could have been listed as a narcotics investigation, traffic arrest, arrest, or something else. Although, narcotics investigation reports were most common in both years (59 in 2009, and 67 in 2010), they accounted for only 26 percent of reports in 2009, but nearly 83 percent of reports in 2010. This suggests that the activities in 2010 were much more narrowly focused than in 2009, which is consistent with statements of law enforcement officials involved with CAGI.

Map C shows the locations of all 2009 CAGI OAI Tiburon incident locations involving an arrest, by IMPD beat. This map documents the locations of these arrests, not the number of individuals arrested or the number of charges listed. This map excludes 17 incidents that reported an IMPD district office as the location of the arrest. CAGI OAI 2009 target beats are outlined in red on the map and darker shading indicates a larger percentage of the total arrest locations in the beat. Of the 183 arrest locations listed, 51 percent (94) fell within CAGI target beats and 49 percent (89) fell outside CAGI target areas. The map clearly indicates that arrest activities listed as being associated with CAGI were spread throughout much of the midsection of the city of Indianapolis. Map C also shows that arrest locations were concentrated within the target beats of NE 21, 23, 24, and 51, as well as SW 11 and 12. Some additional arrest activities appeared to be concentrated in beats adjacent to the target beats such as NE 13, 31.



Table 2: CAGI OAI Tiburon incident reports by beat, 2009 and 2010

Beat	2009		2010	
	Count	%	Count	%
SE district office	12	5.3%	5	6.2%
SW district office	4	1.8%	17	21.0%
NE district office	1	0.4%	34	42.0%
CAGI target				
NE24	28	12.4%	1	1.2%
SW11	21	9.3%	5	6.2%
NE23	17	7.6%	1	1.2%
NE51	15	6.7%	1	1.2%
NE21	14	6.2%	0	0.0%
SW12	9	4.0%	6	7.4%
Non-target				
All other	32	14.2%	7	8.6%
NE11	20	8.9%	0	0.0%
NE12	18	8.0%	0	0.0%
NE13	6	2.7%	0	0.0%
SW13	6	2.7%	3	3.7%
NE31	5	2.2%	0	0.0%
DT32	4	1.8%	0	0.0%
SE12	4	1.8%	0	0.0%
DT21	3	1.3%	0	0.0%
DT22	3	1.3%	0	0.0%
NE53	3	1.3%	1	1.2%
Total	225	100.0%	81	100.0%

Source: IMPD Tiburon incident reports associated with CAGI OAI activities

Notes:

There was one incident report listed as being CAGI-related in each month for January, February, and March, 2009, prior to the start of the OAI initiative. These reports are most likely indirectly related to legitimate CAGI 2009 OAI activities. This could be because a person was arrested who was a suspect in a prior case, for example.

All other for 2009 includes NE65, DT31, ND21, ND43, NE22, NW24, and SE13 with two CAGI OAI incident reports each. DT12, ND22, ND23, NE14, NE32, NE33, NE54, NE64, NW13, NW21, NW72, SE11, SE21, SE22, SE42, Speedway, SW61, SW82 each reported one CAGI-related incident report in 2009. All other for 2010 includes one incident report each in DT12, DT31, ND11, NE33, NE63, NW21, and SW21.

District offices are included here because drug buys are archived or logged into evidence at these locations.

2010 total does not include one traffic arrest reported in 2011.

2010 total does not include additional Tiburon report generated for each month in February, March, and June of 2010, which appear to be included because they were indirectly related with a later CAGI case.

Table 3: IMPD OAI initiative Tiburon reports by type, 2009, 2010

Report type	2009		2010	
	Count	%	Count	%
Narcotics investigation	59	26.0%	67	82.7%
Traffic arrest	55	24.2%	5	6.2%
Arrest on warrant	53	23.3%	4	4.9%
Search warrant served	16	7.0%	0	0.0%
All other	11	4.8%	1	1.2%
Commercial sex	10	4.4%	1	1.2%
Public intoxication	7	3.1%	0	0.0%
Vice investigation	6	2.6%	1	1.2%
Arrest	3	1.3%	0	0.0%
Disturbance	3	1.3%	0	0.0%
Firearms investigation	2	0.9%	1	1.2%
Investigation	2	0.9%	1	1.2%
Total	227	100.0%	81	100.0%

Source: IMPD Tiburon incident reports associated with CAGI OAI activities

Notes:


Total for 2009 excludes 3 Tiburon arrests listed prior to May 2009. These are most likely linked to other Tiburon reports generated after May 2009 when the subgrant was awarded.

All other includes single reports of the following types of activities in 2009: invasion privacy, disturbance - shots fired, domestic disturbance, DWI arrest, kidnap /ransom, larceny/bicycle, conversion / vehicle, armed robbery, traffic investigation, vehicle tow, and burglary. In 2010, all other refers to Larceny/over \$200.

Total for 2010 does not include one traffic arrest reported in 2011.


Total for 2010 does not include one Tiburon report generated for each month in February, March, and June of 2010, which appear to be included because they were indirectly related with a later CAGI case.

Map C: CAGI OAI Tiburon incident locations involving an arrest, by IMPD beat, 2009





Map D: CAGI OAI Tiburon incident locations involving an arrest, by IMPD beat, 2010





Map D shows the locations of 2010 CAGI-related incident reports involving an arrest with a location other than an IMPD district office listed. In 2010, there were 25 arrest locations listed in incident reports; 13 were in CAGI target beats and 12 were outside target beats. More than half (56 percent) of the arrests were concentrated in the SW district, with 44 percent in target beats SW 11 (16 percent) and SW12 (28 percent), and an additional 10 percent in non-target beat SW13. An additional arrest was noted in each of two CAGI target beats on the east side of Indianapolis, NE24 and NE51. It is important to note that at the time these reports were generated a large percentage of CAGI-related activity appeared to consist of archived drug buys used to build larger cases rather than single purchase arrests. Recall that 80 percent of activities listed the district office as their location in 2010. Unfortunately, mapping the actual locations of where those archived drug buys took place was not possible.

Additional 2010 open air drug market initiative information

For 2010, IMPD developed a relational database to track CAGI cases, in addition to keeping track

of all CAGI-related Tiburon reports. Table 4 shows some of the information tracked within that database. Nearly 2,500 hours of overtime were associated with CAGI activities in 2010. Of this time, 433 hours were devoted to surveillance. There were 78 archived buys, 40 undercover buys, 22 controlled buys, and 4 buy-busts listed. There were search warrants executed and 24 gang contact sheets completed. In terms of arrests, there were 57 listed. It should be noted that arrest here refers to a charge rather than an individual, and therefore the number of arrests can exceed the number of individuals arrested. There were 16 (28 percent of 57) arrests where a gang enhancement was added to the original charge, and 3 of these were felonies. Various quantities of drugs, cash, and firearms were seized. It should be noted that totals listed here may vary from other tables due to differences in the Tiburon CAGI OAI incident reports and the IMPD CAGI database.

Evidence of Gangs in 2009 and 2010 Open Air Drug Market Initiative Documentation

Tiburon incident information for 2009 and 2010 was largely devoid of any reference to gangs. The

Table 4: Information on 2010 CAGI OAI activities from IMPD CAGI database

Overtime hours	
Total hours	2487.75
Surveillance hours	432.75
Drug buys	
Archived buys	78
Undercover buys	40
Controlled buys	22
Buy busts	4
Other activity	
Gang contact sheets	24
Search warrants	5
Confidential informants signed	2
Arrests	
Overall total	57
w/ gang enhancement	16
felony w/ gang enhancement	3
Seizures	
Marijuana (g)	11,518
Cocaine (g)	38
Methamphetamine (g)	56
Firearms	7
Cash	\$30,349

Source: Access database developed by IMPD

Notes:

Totals not directly comparable with previous tables because nature of information recorded here is different than Tiburon database.

Arrest numbers here refer to the number of charges not the number of individuals arrested.

Arrest numbers are as of the time the database information was transmitted and therefore underestimate arrest totals because a number of archived buys were made to build cases for future arrests.



term gang only appeared once in any 2009 or 2010 Tiburon report reviewed here. Therefore, to examine the connection of 2009 and 2010 CAGI OAI activity with gangs, additional information was sought from IMPD liaisons. IMPD officials maintained a record of cases that were forwarded to the CAGI-dedicated prosecutor each month. These cases were considered the most serious cases of arrests made during CAGI activities. A manual search of the IMPD gang database was conducted to determine whether the names of arrestees in forwarded cases were listed as known or suspected gang members in 2009. Overall, 19 of 96 (20 percent) arrestees were located within the gang database.

Another portion of the relational database maintained by IMPD for 2010 CAGI OAI activities listed arrestees. Eleven of the 32 arrestees tracked in that database contained some reference to gang affiliation (suspected or confirmed as gang member or specific gang affiliation).

OAI Impact Analysis

As noted above, one goal of CCJR's evaluation was to assess the impact of CAGI OAI activities on crime in the target areas. Because the OAI activities focused on drug crimes as a way of reducing gang activity, ideally one would examine the impact of LE activities such as arrests and prosecutions on drug and gang crime. These would be the kinds of crime expected to be most proximally impacted by OAI activity if the underlying logic of the initiative was correct. However, no information for either type of crime is being systematically collected. In the absence of such information, CCJR researchers hypothesized (consistent with statements made by IMPD officers supervising these activities) that CAGI OAI activities should also reduce serious crimes of all types in these areas. The best indicator of serious crimes that is systematically collected is the Uniform Crime Report data that are collected by local police agencies and submitted annually to the FBI. UCR Part I data are collected on seven major types of violent crime (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assaults) and property crime (motor vehicle theft, burglary, larceny). This information is gleaned from Tiburon incident reports by IMPD personnel trained in UCR reporting standards.

Trends in the number of UCR crimes in target beat areas were analyzed to assess the impact of the OAI interventions. The analysis hypothesized that OAI arrests would decrease the number of Part I UCR crimes that occurred in the targeted

beat areas. Removing drug market perpetrators was hypothesized to (1) reduce the number of individuals on the street who would commit other crimes, and (2) potentially lead to a general deterrence effect where knowledge and visibility of arrests would decrease criminal activity.

Description of methods

To quantify the impact of OAI interventions on criminal activity, UCR data provided by IMPD were analyzed as a time series going back to February 2000 for the three targeted beat areas, including: Northeast (NE21, NE22, NE23, NE24, NE51), Northwest (NW21, NW24, NW33), and Southwest (SW11, SW12). Beat boundaries as defined in 2010 were used for the entire analysis period, ignoring the potential for beat boundaries to change over time. To identify the appropriate points in the time series where the intervention occurred, data on OAI activity were reviewed for "spikes" in arrests (Figure 1).

The data show that the period from June 2009, through October 2009, recorded the highest intensity of arrests. While OAI activity occurred in other months and in 2010 as well, the "intervention" was identified by selecting those months with the highest frequency of arrests and summonses for each target area. The infrequent nature of arrests and summonses associated with OAI activity in some months is unlikely to have a significant (i.e., measurable) impact on UCR trends, so only those periods with the heaviest activity were analyzed. As noted above, most of the 2010 activity appeared to be archived drug buys that led to later arrest and prosecution, so, one would not expect to see any impact of these activities on crime in the targeted areas until such arrests were made. Therefore, examination of the impact of OAI activities was limited to the peak period in 2009.


From the OAI data, the following were determined to be the high impact intervention periods:

- Northeast target area: June 2009 – September 2009
- Northwest target area: September 2009 – October 2009
- Southwest target area: August 2009 – October 2009

In comparing the activity between target areas, it should be expected that the Northeast target area should have experienced the most significant decline in crimes after the OAI intervention. Seventy-five arrests and summonses were logged



Figure 1: OAI arrests and summonses, by target beat area



in the Northeast district, compared to 30 in the Southwest district and 3 in the Northwest district. Thus, a higher number of criminal perpetrators removed from the streets (i.e., a reduction in the “supply” of criminal perpetrators) should lead to a reduction in criminal activity after their removal. Reductions in crime as measured by UCR data could suggest that (1) crimes that would have otherwise been committed by OAI-arrested individuals do not occur, and/or (2) that the increased enforcement presence from OAI activities had a general deterrence impact on other individuals in the respective area. This analysis does not attempt to distinguish between the two, but only tries to measure the overall change in criminal activity after the intervention.

Criminal activity for each target area was modeled for total crimes (all UCR categories), violent crimes (homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery), and property crimes (all other Part I UCR categories). In all, nine models were created (three for each target area) to assess the impact of OAI interventions on criminal activity after that intervention.

Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) modeling

The most appropriate means of quantifying the effect of OAI interventions is by applying the Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model with an intervention compo-

nent. In practical terms, an ARIMA model uses the historical observations of the time series itself to generate a prediction of how UCR crimes vary by month and by season. The ARIMA model uses a combination of lagged (prior) levels (the autoregressive component) of crimes in the target area, a moving average of random variations (the moving average component), and the occasional need to “difference” the data (i.e., to subtract previous values to eliminate upward or downward trends in the data) to filter out systematic effects in predicting current and future levels of crime. Once that systematic variation is accounted for, a dichotomous (0=Pre-OAI; 1=Post-OAI) variable is introduced into the model. The magnitude and statistical significance of that dichotomous intervention variable quantifies the impact of the OAI intervention itself.

Mathematically, the intervention analysis takes the form of a modified regression analysis:

$$Y_{ij} = N_t + \omega I_t$$

where Y_{ij} denotes the observed number of UCR crimes for a given target area in a given month, N_t is the ARIMA specification (some combination of historical observations of crime data and moving averages of those data), I_t is the dichotomous intervention variable (0=Pre-OAI; 1=Post-OAI), and ω is the numeric estimate for the impact of the OAI intervention.



If ω is greater than zero, then the OAI intervention is associated with an increase in crimes; if ω is less than zero the OAI intervention is associated with a *decrease* in crimes; if ω equals zero then the OAI is determined to have had no impact on criminal activity in the target area.

UCR data exhibit considerable seasonal variation, so the data were seasonally adjusted before applying the intervention model described above. The seasonal adjustment process involved calculating moving averages for UCR crimes from 2000 through 2010 and then adjusting particular months that were consistently above the average (seasonal peaks) downward and adjusting months consistently below average (seasonal dips) upward. The adjustment preserves much of the underlying variation in the data, while filtering out seasonal peaks and valleys.

Results

Figure 2 shows historical trends in UCR criminal activity for the three target areas from 2000 through 2010. The Northeast target area had the highest level of criminal activity, nearly twice as high as the Northwest or Southwest areas. Prior to the intervention, the Northeast area averaged 376 total crimes, 160 violent crimes, and 216


property crimes per month (Table 5). The Northwest area averaged 193 total crimes monthly and the Southwest area 98 total crimes monthly.

It is important to note that the *Intervention estimate* values are predicted values that may not necessarily match actual differences between pre- and post-intervention means. Differences are due to the fact that the ARIMA modeling procedure attempts to detect an inherent pattern of monthly activity over time and, once identified, control for that pattern and measure the change at the time of the intervention. The pre- and post-intervention means are just simple averages of all values and not an indication of the pattern in UCR activity.

Northeast target area

As general measures, Table 5 shows that the average level of total, violent, and property crimes declined in the Northeast area after the intervention. However, the mean levels ignore the inherent relationship of particular levels of criminal activity over time. Past values and trends can be used to predict current and future values in the time series, so a comparison of pre- and post- intervention data must account for this correlation.

Figure 2: Monthly UCR crimes by target beat area, seasonally adjusted



**Table 5: Average of UCR crimes by crime type and target area, February 2000 to December 2010**

				Estimate of Impact from OAI Intervention				
	Pre-intervention mean	Post-intervention mean	ARIMA specification (p,d,q)	Intervention estimate (change from the mean)	Std Error	P Value	95% Conf Interval-Low	95% Conf Interval-High
Northeast target area								
Total UCR crimes	376	339	(0,1,1)	-52.6	23.52	0.03	-99.6	-5.5
Violent UCR crimes	160	156	(2,0,1)	-14.6	7.49	0.05	-29.6	0.3
Property UCR crimes	216	183	(0,1,1)	-25.6	11.59	0.03	-48.8	-2.4
Northwest target area								
Total UCR crimes	193	209	(1,0,0)	not statistically different from zero				
Violent UCR crimes	61	68	(1,0,0)	not statistically different from zero				
Property UCR crimes	132	142	(1,0,0)	not statistically different from zero				
Southwest target area								
Total UCR crimes	98	116	(2,0,1)	not statistically different from zero				
Violent UCR crimes	42	45	(1,0,0)	-7.4	3.48	0.03	-14.4	-0.5
Property UCR crimes	56	71	(0,1,1)	not statistically different from zero				

Source: IMPD

Note: The ARIMA specification (p,d,q) denotes the parameters used to control for systematic variation. p=autoregressive (lagged value) parameters; d=differencing necessary to remove trends; q=moving average parameters.

The ARIMA model does account for this variation, and in fact shows a statistically significant decline in criminal activity in the Northeast area after the intervention. The size of the impact, as specified by the ARIMA model, shows a decline of approximately 53 total crimes from the average level per month, 15 violent crimes below the average per month, and 26 property crimes below the average per month. Since these estimates are probabilistic, they represent a best-approximation of the true impact that falls within a range of values (the confidence interval). Thus, the model predicts with 95% certainty that the true decline in total crimes in the Northeast area as a result of the OAI intervention lies between 5 and 100 crimes per month. This range is quite large and is due to the abbreviated length of the post-intervention time period, which prevents a robust examination of the long-term impact of the OAI intervention.

Northwest target area

The model shows no association between the OAI intervention and changes in criminal activity in the Northwest target area. Compared to the Northeast target area, the number of OAI arrests was much lower and, as a result it is perhaps not surprising that there were no statistically significant declines in criminal activity (as measured by UCR crime reports). This is consistent with other information gathered by CCJR researchers; the NW district simply did not appear to be the focus of CAGI OAI activities in the period examined.

Southwest target area

In general, the association between the OAI intervention and other crimes committed in the Southwest area after the intervention were more limited. Although there was no significant impact on total crimes or property crimes, the ARIMA model for violent crimes estimated a decrease of seven violent crimes from the monthly average. Finding that property and total crimes were both unrelated to the OAI is not surprising, given that the large majority of reported UCR offenses are property crimes. Although such results should be interpreted with caution due to the small number of arrests in the SW beat area, it is encouraging that there was a statistically significant reduction in reported UCR violent crimes in the SW beat area.

Discussion

As might be expected given the concentration of arrests there, the OAI intervention in the NE target area had the most measurable and significant effect on criminal activity after the intervention. Whether acting as specific deterrents (removing criminal actors and reducing crimes directly) or as general deterrents on other individuals, the OAI intervention produced a significant decline in the NE target beat area, across all types of UCR crimes examined.

No statistically significant reductions in UCR reported offenses were found in the NW beat area, which is perhaps not surprising given the limited number arrests occurring there. In the



SW target beat area, there was a statistically significant reduction in reported UCR violent crimes in the post intervention period but the OAI activities appeared to have no impact on property offenses (which likely drove the total crime results, which were also associated with significant effects). The single statistically significant result in the other target areas offers evidence of the value of the larger dedication of resources to the Northeast area. However, these results should be considered as tentative and potentially weak given that only 12 to 15 months of post-intervention data were available for analysis. A longer post-intervention time series would provide more robust estimates of the magnitude and duration of effects. For example, it is possible that the significant declines in the Northeast area were temporary and that crime levels may return to historical levels in the long run. It is also important to bear in mind that the UCR offenses modeled here are not the most proximate outcomes one would expect to be impacted by such activities. Therefore, different results might have been generated if ARIMA models had been examined drug or gang crimes in relation to OAI activities in the target areas.

Assessment of CAGI 2009 and 2010 Open Air initiatives

The information presented here documents the activities of the 2009 and 2010 CAGI OAI by IMPD and the impact of the 2009 activities on crime in the targeted beat areas. The goal of these initiatives was to reduce drug market activity in open drug markets on the premise that gangs were often involved in drug trafficking. As such, the high number of drug arrests and prosecutions should not be surprising. In 2009, there were 219 individuals arrested on 305 charges according to CAGI-related Tiburon reports. More than one-third of these charges (120) were for drug trafficking or possession. More than half (54 of 111) of charges forwarded to the CAGI prosecutor for review involved drug possession or trafficking (most often at the felony level). For CAGI defendants arrested in 2009, there were 22 listed as prosecuted according to the CAGI prosecutor, resulting in 20 convictions. The remaining two cases were individuals still wanted by police. The large majority of these cases involved felony drug trafficking.

In 2010, 29 individuals were arrested on 63 charges. However, available information suggests that this likely underestimates the total number of arrests associated with 2010 CAGI activities

because a large number of archived buys were made to build cases for later prosecution. Similar to 2009, nearly two-thirds of the charges at arrest were for drug trafficking or possession (mostly felony level). Of the 20 cases forwarded to the CAGI prosecutor with a 2010 arrest date, 19 were convicted (nearly all on dealing cocaine or heroin charges). One defendant was listed as wanted by police and two cases involved plea agreements to resolve 2009 and 2010 cases.

Examination of the gang connection in 2009 and 2010 CAGI activities was complicated by the fact that only one CAGI OAI Tiburon report even mentioned the word gang. An examination of the gang database created by the IMPD show that of 96 cases forwarded to the CAGI prosecutor in 2009, nearly 20 percent (19 individuals) were listed in the IMPD gang database as known or suspected gang members. In 2010, fewer individuals had been arrested. Examination of the relational database maintained by the IMPD showed that 11 of 32 arrestees tracked there were listed as suspected or confirmed gang members.

One challenge to the documentation of the CAGI activities as it relates to showing a gang connection is that there appears to be no systematic data collection on which individuals confronted by police are gang members/gang involved or suspected to have gang ties. There is a mechanism for documenting this information through gang contact sheets and on Tiburon reports. However, IMPD officers do not appear to systematically document this information. This may be because historically documentation of gang member activities was discouraged by IMPD and city officials (noted by several officers in personal communications with the author).

It is important to note that the data reported here are only as accurate as the information contained in the data provided, primarily Tiburon incident reports. Extensive examination of these reports suggests that there are some limitations when using them as a primary source of data for this type of evaluation. For example, in 70 percent of 2010 CAGI OAI incident reports the location of activity was a district office address. There may be good reasons for this within the logic of the Tiburon system when it is used for police purposes. However, this severely limits its utility in documenting the geographic distribution of CAGI activity relative to CAGI target beats.

Similarly, a relational database was developed by IMPD in consultation with CCJR researchers and maintained for 2010. Unfortunately, there



appeared to be some discrepancies between numbers derived from examination of CAGI-related Tiburon reports and the relational database. There may be good reasons for the differences but this would require extensive follow up to ascertain them. Originally it was envisioned that information would be kept for all CAGI-related activities, specifically the lead information source (how the officer came to be investigating this person or situation) and the result (e.g., probable cause for arrest, search warrant). This information was only entered for some Tiburon incidents, however.

It is also likely that the information presented here somewhat understates the gang connection to enforcement activities associated with the 2009 and 2010 OAI. Reports from IMPD officers involved with the project and follow up conversations with them give the impression that gangs are heavily involved with drug trafficking in Indianapolis. It is possible that limitations in the available tracking mechanisms make this connection appear weaker than it is. The degree to which this drug-gang connection is underestimated in the current data is not knowable. Following several years of listening to law enforcement officers while involved with this project there is a clear disconnect between what the available data show and the reality of gang activity and gang-involved drug crime in Indianapolis. Efforts to track gang crime more systematically in Indianapolis have so far proved difficult to implement.

It does not appear that federal prosecutions by the U.S. Attorney's office were significant in the CAGI OAI cases. No federal prosecutions were reported for in 2009-2010 CAGI OAI cases. In future open air drug market investigations, additional efforts should be made to enhance the number of federal prosecutions.

Attendance at several meetings among law enforcement and prosecution by CCJR researchers suggests that the CAGI Prosecutor may have been engaged too early and as a result waited several months while cases were being established for prosecution. Eventually the flow of cases was significant. To avoid this in the future, it might make sense to have a lag between when enforcement activities begin and the dedicated prosecutor is engaged.

Despite the challenges associated with collection of appropriate metrics to evaluate this project, some OAI activities did appear to be associated with reductions in crime. Examination of the impact of 2009 OAI activities on reported serious crimes (as measured by UCR crime reports) in

three target beat areas (NE, NW, and SW) showed statistically significant reductions of both property and violent offenses reported in the NE area and reductions in violent crime in the SW beat area. These conclusions should be regarded as tentative, however, as noted above. Although these results are somewhat encouraging, it is important to be clear that the most proximate indicators of crime that one would expect such activities to affect would be drug and gang crimes. Unfortunately, systematic information to evaluate the impact of OAI activities on these crimes was not available. This limitation seriously hampered the ability to measure the impact of police activities in the targeted areas.

CAGI LE Activities in 2011

CAGI LE activities for 2011 consisted of initiatives in the SW and NE districts. Because these initiatives involved different subgrants with different underlying logics, they are discussed separately.

Documentation of 2011 CAGI LE activities in the SW district

IMPD was granted \$25,000 in CAGI LE funds to pay overtime to IMPD narcotics unit officers to engage in drug enforcement related to two specific gangs (Haughville Syndicate and Locsville) in the SW district from September 1 through December 31, 2011. Fiscal reporting suggests nearly all of this funding was expended. This operation took advantage of information gleaned in OAI I and II and identified 33 targets for enforcement. This operation focused on identifying and arresting specific problem dealers with gang ties and ranged throughout SW district.

CCJR researchers met with IMPD representatives overseeing the project and determined that weekly reports of activities would best capture the information needed to document CAGI-related activities. Information included dates and hours of CAGI-supported overtime activities, as well as drug surveillance, purchases, arrests, and seizures. This information was supplemented by information relating to gang affiliations of specific arrestees provided by the project supervisor to CCJR researchers.

Results of CAGI SW district activities 2011

Table 6 documents basic information on the program activities and outputs during the subgrant period (September 1 through December 31,



2011). Overall, there were a total of 23 separate occasions in which SW district narcotics officers used CAGI overtime dollars, totaling 512 hours. Overtime hours were used mainly from September through November. Only one overtime date was listed in December. Officers reported 191 surveillance hours, occurring mainly in October (82) and November (70). Officers made a total of 26 arrests (this refers to the total number of charges which can exceed the number of individuals placed in custody when someone is charged with more than one offense at arrest), completed 27 controlled buys, 21 archived buys, 15 undercover buys, and 10 buy/busts during the

period. It should be noted here that these numbers are only associated with CAGI overtime hours. Other narcotics unit activities during regular IMPD hours are not included. Thus, the numbers here may underestimate the overall impact of CAGI dollars expended because investigations executed using CAGI dollars may have also cross-fertilized other narcotics investigations. There is some anecdotal evidence from interviews with IMPD personnel that this occurred.

Of the 26 arrests, 15 were felonies and 11 were misdemeanors, with 21 being outright (new charges) and 5 warrant arrests (Table 7). In terms

Table 6: CAGI 2011 Southwest district law enforcement activities

Activities	September		October		November		December		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Overtime days	7	30.4%	9	39.1%	6	26.1%	1	4.3%	23	100.0%
Overtime hours	152	29.7%	188	36.7%	148	28.9%	24	4.7%	512	100.0%
Surveillance hours	35	18.3%	82	42.9%	70	36.6%	4	2.1%	191	100.0%
Arrests	2	7.7%	7	26.9%	14	53.8%	3	11.5%	26	100.0%
Controlled buys	9	33.3%	12	44.4%	6	22.2%	0	0.0%	27	100.0%
Archived buys	9	42.9%	8	38.1%	4	19.0%	0	0.0%	21	100.0%
Buy/busts	0	0.0%	4	40.0%	3	30.0%	3	30.0%	10	100.0%
Undercover buys	2	13.3%	7	46.7%	6	40.0%	0	0.0%	15	100.0%

Source: Weekly excel spreadsheets provided to CCJR by IMPD

Notes:

Overtime days refers to the number of dates upon which overtime funds were spent in CAGI activities.

Arrest totals are most likely an underestimate due to the large number of controlled, archived and undercover buys.

Table 7: Information on 2011 CAGI Southwest district law enforcement activities

Arrests	
Overall total	26
Felony	15
outright	13
warrant	2
Misdemeanor	11
outright	8
warrant	3
Seizures	
Marijuana (g)	9.1
Cocaine (g)	25.5
Vehicles	2
Firearms	4
Cash	\$283

Source: Weekly excel spreadsheets provided to CCJR by IMPD

Notes:

Felony arrests included 13 narcotics arrests.

Arrest numbers here refer to the number of charges not the number of individuals arrested.

Arrest numbers are as of the time the database information was transmitted and therefore underestimate arrest totals because a number of archived buys were made to build cases for future arrests.



of drug seizures, 9.1 grams of marijuana were seized, along with 25.5 grams of cocaine, 2 vehicles, 4 firearms, and \$283 in cash. These arrest numbers no doubt underestimate the total number of arrests that will ultimately result from these activities because arrests had not been made in several archived buys (used to build cases for later prosecution). In addition, three search warrants were obtained (not shown in table).

Although no gang contact sheets were reported as having been produced nor were any cases with gang enhancements generated, there did appear to be a fairly strong link to gangs among arrestees. In a summary produced by the IMPD project coordinator, 20 separate individual arrestees were listed (Table 8). Of these, three were known gang members, two were suspected gang members, three were relatives or associates of known gang members, one was believed to have participated in a gang-related homicide, five were reported to deal drugs for known gang members, and three were located using the phone contacts of a known drug dealer related to a known gang member. Of the 20 individuals, only three did not have some link to either the Haughville Syndicate or Locsville gangs. Thus, there appears to have been a strong gang connection among the individuals arrested using CAGI LE funding.

Assessment of 2011 SW district CAGI LE activities

The dollar amount of this subgrant was not large (\$25,000) but it appears that the SW district officers used the money effectively to produce a substantial number of drug arrests of individuals that were known gang members or directly affiliated with gang members in some way. Of the 20 individuals identified in Table 8, 17 had some clear connection to known or suspected Haughville Syndicate or Locsville gang members. The documented gang connection in this subgrant is perhaps the strongest of any law enforcement activities associated with CAGI. It should be noted, however, that no gang contact sheets or cases with a gang enhancement were reported in the activity logs associated with this subgrant.

Documentation of 2011 CAGI LE activities in NE district

In 2011 NE district received CAGI funding (\$173,921) combined with Indiana Project Safe Neighborhoods funding (\$41,549) totaling \$215,470 to engage in a multi-faceted approach to gun and gang crime reduction. The application focused on the following seen as problem areas: NE21, 22, 23, 24, 71, 72, 73). These initiatives

Table 8: Reported links to gangs among SW District CAGI arrestees, 2011

Arrestee	Known or suspected gang ties
Arr 1	known Haughville Syndicate member
Arr 2	known Haughville Syndicate member
Arr 3	known Locsville member
Arr 4	suspected Haughville Syndicate member, phone number in arrestee 7's phone
Arr 5	suspected Haughville Syndicate member, phone number in arrestee 7's phone
Arr 6	suspected to have participated in Haughville Syndicate homicide
Arr 7	related to known Haughville Syndicate member
Arr 8	accompanied by known Haughville Syndicate dealer
Arr 9	associate of Haughville Syndicate leader
Arr 10	deals for known Haughville Syndicate member
Arr 11	deals for known Haughville Syndicate member
Arr 12	deals for known Haughville Syndicate member
Arr 13	deals for known Haughville Syndicate member
Arr 14	deals for known Locsville member
Arr 15	phone number in arrestee 7's phone
Arr 16	phone number in arrestee 7's phone
Arr 17	phone number in arrestee 7's phone
Arr 18	no reported gang link
Arr 19	no reported gang link
Arr 20	no reported gang link

Source: Summary Report of SW District CAGI 2011 activities

Note:

Charges were not filed by the prosecutor in the case of one of the arrestees with no reported gang link.



were broadly categorized as suppression, intervention, and prevention. The activities of the project included two broad activities labeled as *suppression* within the grant application. The first portion was called the Violent Crime Reduction Initiative (VCRI) and involved the use of directed patrols in high crime areas within the NE district. The application noted that major thoroughfares appeared to allow easy entry and exit into the area for gang members and other would-be criminals. The goal of the VCRI was to increase patrols in these areas to suppress gun and gang crime.

A second major activity within the suppression portion of the grant was called Operation Save a Cop. The goal was to increase successful firearm seizures and prosecutions of gun crimes. To accomplish this goal, a training program was implemented to increase officer knowledge on how to process seized firearms and necessary follow up to build successful cases for prosecution. Basic training was provided to officers at roll calls and additional training would go to *firearms liaisons*. Cameras and other equipment would support the processing of evidence at the firearm crime scene. Additional activities included proactively investigating cases with traced firearms. Funding for a detective to engage in social network research to look for evidence of illegal firearm possession or gang activity was also sought (as well as software to properly document the evidence).

The second major portion of the project was labeled *intervention*. This portion of the project involved expansion of the Gang Reduction, Identification, Documentation and Elimination (G-RIDE) initiative. G-RIDE was designed to provide local school personnel with the information and equipment necessary to recognize and respond to gang activities in schools. Computers and portable hard drives were requested to support G-RIDE activities in schools within CAGI target areas. An aggressive media campaign to reduce gun and gang violence was also proposed, including bill boards, television advertising, t-shirts, bus advertising, and any others available.

The third area of the grant was labeled *prevention*. The goal of this portion of the project was to update a previously funded anti-violence prevention program called EKG (Educating Kids about Gun Violence). The goal of this revision was to shorten the program from approximately two hours to 60-90 minutes and sharpen the anti-gun message.

CCJR data collection

This evaluation focuses on the suppression-related activities identified in the grant application. CCJR researchers met with IMPD personnel overseeing the project periodically to determine what types of information were being collected to document grant activities. Prior experience with OAI activities had provided a blue print for the types of information that could reasonably be collected by IMPD personnel without creating an undue additional burden. The development of a database to capture grant activities greatly facilitated data collection. This database included overtime hours and the types of activities associated with each overtime activity. In addition, arrest information was captured within the database for analysis. Additional documentation of actual grant activities was provided (to CCJR researchers and the PSN/CAGI steering committee) in the form of narrative summaries by the project commander. The information discussed below comes from these two sources as well as interviews with project personnel. The next section discusses specific information gleaned from the project database, followed by discussion of narrative project documents provided to CCJR researchers.

Documentation of 2011 CAGI activities in the NE district from database

Table 9 provides a summary of the overtime entries and hours associated with CAGI 2011 NE activities by month. Overall, there were 304 log entries of various types from May through December 2011, ranging from 1 in November to 84 in July. Overtime hours associated with the project totaled 2,461 and ranged from 4 in November to 877 in June. Although the grant period included April, the overtime log included only two entries of *administrative time* totaling 9.5 hours.

Table 10 reports the types of activities listed in the overtime log by month. These entries appear to record the types of activities to which the officers were detailed. Of the 302 entries in the log, nearly two-thirds (200) were listed as *directed patrol*. Forty-two entries (14 percent) were listed as *narcotics*. An additional four percent each were listed as *administrative* and *firearms training*. The remaining 12 percent of entries were listed as *gang* (3 percent), *surveillance* (2 percent) *bike patrol* (2 percent), *warrants* (2 percent), other (1 percent), *Baker One* (domestic violence reduction strategy) (1 percent), and *vice* (1 percent).



Table 9: CAGI NE district overtime log entries and hours, by month, 2011

Month	Overtime entries		Overtime hours	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
May	20	6.6%	437	17.8%
June	63	20.7%	877.25	35.7%
July	84	27.6%	481.5	19.6%
August	16	5.3%	61	2.5%
September	47	15.5%	202.5	8.2%
October	28	9.2%	121	4.9%
November	1	0.3%	4	0.2%
December	45	14.8%	276.25	11.2%
Total	304	100.0%	2460.5	100.0%

Source: IMPD Tiburon database documenting information associated with CAGI NE district activities

Notes:

Excludes one entry each in July, August, and September, and two entries in December where no overtime hours were recorded.

Also excludes two administrative entries in April totalling 9.5 hours.

Table 11 documents the locations of activities associated with CAGI NE district 2011 activities by beat and month. This information comes from a separate database maintained by IMPD personnel. It contains information typically found in the Tiburon incident report system. Perhaps not surprisingly, nearly 89 percent of 286 separate incident report locations occurred within the NE district. Thirty-three reports (11 percent) did list a location outside of NE district. This can occur for a variety of logical reasons. Perhaps most common is that a person will be arrested in a CAGI-related activity. If the individual was arrested on a warrant from elsewhere in the city (or even another jurisdiction such as Lawrence), the location of the incident that generated the warrant was included in the database. Alternatively, activities might begin in a NE district beat but the

investigation might conclude in another area or vice versa.

In terms of specific areas within the NE district, the focus of the activities that were reported were consistent with the areas targeted in the application, with 78.3 percent (198/253) reports listed these areas (NE21, 22, 23, 24, 71, 72, 73) as the beat within which activity occurred. Activities appeared to be concentrated in June (60), July (71), September (46), October (26), and December (67).

The database used to report on CAGI NE district LE activities also listed the type of activity associated with each report. This refers to the activity associated with the incident rather than the type of general assignment to which an officer was detailed. So an officer engaging in a directed

Table 10: CAGI NE district activity type reported in overtime log by month and type, 2011

Activity type	May		June		July		August		September		October		November		December		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Directed Patrol	2	10.5%	35	55.6%	59	70.2%	3	18.8%	41	87.2%	26	96.3%	1	100.0%	33	73.3%	200	66.2%
Narcotics	11	57.9%	11	17.5%	6	7.1%	8	50.0%	2	4.3%	1	3.7%	0	0.0%	3	6.7%	42	13.9%
Administrative	4	21.1%	4	6.3%	3	3.6%	0	0.0%	1	2.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%	13	4.3%
Firearms training	0	0.0%	2	3.2%	9	10.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%	12	4.0%
Gang	0	0.0%	5	7.9%	1	1.2%	1	6.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%	8	2.6%
Surveillance	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	2.4%	1	6.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	4	8.9%	7	2.3%
Bike Patrol	0	0.0%	3	4.8%	0	0.0%	3	18.8%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	6	2.0%
Warrants	0	0.0%	2	3.2%	3	3.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%	6	2.0%
Other	1	5.3%	1	1.6%	1	1.2%	0	0.0%	1	2.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	4	1.3%
Baker one	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	4.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	0.7%
Vice	1	5.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%	2	0.7%
Total	19	100.0%	63	100.0%	84	100.0%	16	100.0%	47	100.0%	27	100.0%	1	100.0%	45	100.0%	302	100.0%

Source: IMPD Tiburon database documenting information associated with CAGI NE district activities

Notes:

Other includes one entry for community events in July and DUI in September.

Excludes 7 entries with no listing on activity type in field, and two administrative entries listed in April.

Firearms training was listed as firearms, firearms training, and gun training.

Table 11: CAGI NE district incident report locations, by month, beat and district, 2011

Beat	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	Total
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Northeast district										
NE72	1	33.3%	0	0.0%	18	30.0%	7	9.9%	0	0.0%
NE71	0	0.0%	2	100.0%	8	13.3%	6	8.5%	0	0.0%
NE23	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	9	15.0%	11	15.5%	4	40.0%
NE24	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.7%	9	12.7%	5	50.0%
NE51	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	3.3%	10	14.1%	0	0.0%
NE73	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	3	4.2%	0	0.0%
NE33	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	10	16.7%	1	1.4%	1	10.0%
NE21	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	3.3%	6	8.5%	0	0.0%
NE31	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	3	4.2%	0	0.0%
NE62	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.4%	0	0.0%
NE22	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	2.8%	0	0.0%
NE53	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	4.3%
NE65	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
NE12	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.4%	0	0.0%
NE14	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%
NE32	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.4%	0	0.0%
Subtotal	1	33.3%	2	100.0%	50	83.3%	61	85.9%	10	100.0%
Other districts										
Southeast	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	3	5.0%	3	4.2%	0	0.0%
Lawrence	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
North	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.7%	5	7.0%	0	0.0%
Downtown	1	33.3%	0	0.0%	4	6.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Southwest	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.7%	2	2.8%	0	0.0%
Northwest	1	33.3%	0	0.0%	1	1.7%	0	0.0%	1	2.2%
Total	3	100.0%	2	100.0%	60	100.0%	71	100.0%	46	100.0%

Source: IMPD Tiburon database documenting information associated with CAGI NE district activities

Notes:

Total does not include 11 reports with no information on incident type. Also excluded are four incident reports listed in January through March 2011 which occurred outside the subgrant period. The database included some instances where more than one record appeared to be associated with the same incident. This can occur because more than one officer can submit an incident report for the same event if they were involved. For instance, there were a total of 55 incident records associated with one large incident involving a gang fight and subsequent search warrant and arrest activity. Duplicates of these records were removed to ensure that activities listed were unique.

Table 12: CAGI NE district Tiburon report activity by month and type, 2011

Activity type	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	Total
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Traffic arrest	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	22	36.7%	27	39.7%	16	61.5%
Arrest on warrant	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	14	23.3%	9	13.2%	5	19.2%
Narcotics investigation	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	6	10.0%	3	4.4%	8	17.4%
Other	1	50.0%	0	0.0%	8	13.3%	17	25.0%	2	4.3%
Firearms investigation	0	0.0%	2	100.0%	0	0.0%	7	10.3%	1	2.2%
Public intoxication	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.7%	3	4.4%	1	2.2%
Disturbance	1	50.0%	0	0.0%	2	3.3%	1	1.5%	0	0.0%
Search warrant served	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	7	11.7%	1	1.5%	0	0.0%
Total	2	100.0%	2	100.0%	60	100.0%	68	100.0%	26	100.0%
Subtotal	2	100.0%	2	100.0%	10	100.0%	46	100.0%	66	100.0%
Total	2	100.0%	2	100.0%	10	100.0%	46	100.0%	66	100.0%

Source: IMPD Tiburon database documenting information associated with CAGI NE district activities

Notes:

Other includes two reports each of: commercial sex, damage to city property, disturbance – fight, domestic battery, immediate detention, larceny-over 200, recovered property, runaway, and one report each of: additional information, aggravated assault-knife, apprehended runaway, arrest, arson-other-crops/timber, DWI arrest, fire investigation, invasion privacy, located runaway, lost or stolen license plate, re-arrest warrant filed, recovered stolen vehicle, robbery-armed-residence, sick-injured officer, stolen vehicle, trespassing, and vice investigation. Total does not include 11 reports with no information on incident type. Also excluded are four additional incident reports with dates January through March 2011 prior to the subgrant start date. The database included some instances where more than one record appeared to be associated with the same incident. This can occur because more than one officer can submit an incident report for the same event if they were involved. For instance, there were a total of 55 incident records associated with one large incident involving a gang fight and subsequent search warrant and arrest activity. Duplicates of these records were removed to ensure that activities listed were unique.



patrol could list the activity type in this database as a traffic arrest. The type of activity recorded is up to the discretion of the officer so the descriptions reported here are of necessity reliant on that information. This presents some difficulties because one officer might list an arrest on a warrant during a traffic stop as a traffic arrest or a warrant arrest. Because CCJR researchers relied on available data, there was no way to determine the degree to which coding was consistent across incidents. Table 12 breaks down the type of activity listed by month from April through December 2011.

In all 282 separate incidents were listed. Eleven reports were excluded because no incident type was recorded. The most common activity listed was a *traffic arrest* accounting for nearly half (47 percent) of activity types listed. The next most common activity was *arrest on warrant* (18 percent). An additional 12 percent were listed as *narcotics investigation* and 4 percent were listed as *firearms investigation*. There appeared to be a relatively large number of miscellaneous police activities documented. Thirty-four (12 percent) reports listed here as *other* included a wide range of activities mentioned only once or twice, ranging from dealing with mentally ill individuals to runaways. This is no doubt partially accounted for by the fact that individual officers determine the activity type to record and a wide variety of activities can occur within the course of a police officer's shift.

Table 13 documents the number of individuals arrested in LE activities in the NE district from April through December 2011. A total of 250 sep-

arate individuals were listed as being arrested in the database provided to CCJR researchers by IMPD personnel. Determining the exact number of arrestees was complicated by the fact that many individual names were listed more than once. This could legitimately occur if they were arrested on more than one occasion. Names could also be repeated in the database if more than one officer was involved in an incident and filed a separate incident report naming that individual. Thus, the 250 count represents unique individuals listed in the arrest file. Nine individuals with no arrest date were excluded from this total because it was not possible to verify that their arrest occurred within the grant period. December (61), June (55), and July (50) saw the most arrests, followed by September (44) and October (25). Only nine individuals were arrested in August and two individuals were arrested each in April, May, and November.

Table 14 documents the types of offenses for which individuals were arrested in the NE district CAGI-related 2011 activities. A total of 356 offenses were listed. Note that this total exceeds the number of individuals arrested because an individual can have more than one charge at arrest. Only the top three charges were listed. Thus, the total listed here might underestimate the total number of charges slightly because an individual might have more than three charges at arrest. It is also important to note that these are charges as determined by the officer at the time of the arrest. Future decisions by the prosecutor as to what specific charges to prosecute might alter these charges.

Table 13: CAGI NE district individuals arrested, by month, 2011

Month	Count	%
April	2	0.8%
May	2	0.8%
June	55	22.0%
July	50	20.0%
August	9	3.6%
September	44	17.6%
October	25	10.0%
November	2	0.8%
December	61	24.4%
Total	250	100.0%

Source: IMPD Tiburon database documenting information associated with CAGI NE district activities

Notes:

Individuals can be arrested on multiple charges so the number of charges will exceed the number of individuals arrested.

Total does not include one individual listed in the database who was arrested in January 2011. The total also excludes nine individuals for whom no date of arrest information was available.



Nearly 42 percent of charges at arrest were traffic related, including 88 (25 percent) driving while on a suspended license with prior offense, 42 (12 percent) operating a vehicle while never licensed, and 13 (4 percent) driving while suspended. An additional 20 percent (72) of charges were drug related, including 47 possession offenses and 25 drug dealing offenses. A total of 44 charges (12 percent) were weapons offenses or violent crimes, including 14 resisting law enforcement, 9 carrying a handgun without a license, 7 serious violent felon possessing a firearm, and 6 criminal gang, 6 robbery, and 2 homicide charges. An additional 24 offenses were public order or property offenses. Nearly 16 percent of all charges (56) were warrants for other offenses. Occasionally the report listed the crime for which

the warrant had been issued, but most often this information was not available.

The database also included information, such as the overtime log noted 61 gang contacts, 22 domestic contacts, and 7 problem domestic contacts. The notes field of the database often described the nature of the activities engaged in by officers, such as the following (all names excised):

- DMI Roundup
- DMI Warrants Served; 17 warrants served
- DMI call out
- Made stop and arrest on previous incident of shooting an IMPD police car

Table 14: CAGI NE district charges at arrest, by type, 2011

Offense	Count	%
Traffic		
Driving while suspended with prior	88	24.7%
Operating vehicle never licensed	42	11.8%
Driving while suspended	13	3.7%
Habitual traffic violator	3	0.8%
DUI-felony	2	0.6%
Drug related		
Possession of marijuana	24	6.7%
Possession of cocaine	15	4.2%
Dealing cocaine	16	4.5%
Dealing marijuana	7	2.0%
Possession of paraphernalia	6	1.7%
Dealing controlled substance	2	0.6%
Possession of heroin	2	0.6%
Weapons or violent offenses		
Resist law enforcement	14	3.9%
Carry handgun no license	9	2.5%
Serious violent felon possess firearm	7	2.0%
Criminal gang	6	1.7%
Robbery	6	1.7%
Homicide	2	0.6%
Property or public order offenses		
Public intoxication	6	1.7%
Trespass	5	1.4%
Disorderly conduct	4	1.1%
Prostitution	3	0.8%
Invasion of privacy	2	0.6%
Runaway	2	0.6%
Theft	2	0.6%
Warrant and other		
Warrant	56	15.7%
Other	12	3.4%
Total	356	100.0%

Source: IMPD Tiburon database documenting information associated with CAGI NE district activities

Notes:

Individuals can be arrested on multiple charges so the number of charges will exceed the number of individuals arrested.

Other includes one arrest each for aggravated assault with a weapon, arson, auto theft, criminal recklessness, escape/ fleeing, immediate detention, obstructing law enforcement, possession of alcohol by minor, possession of schedule III controlled substance, possession of schedule IV controlled substance, reckless driving.



- Monkey Squad gang has been beating homeless people and causing problems at public library. 10 Monkey Squad members went to library to cause problems. 3 were arrested
- Pop it off boys round up; Warrants issued for 18 listed suspects
- Research Gangs
- Search for Pop-it Off Boy - Homicide Suspect
- Sgt. called out for drug/gun arrests
- Street Crimes Unit conducted surveillance in an effort to arrest suspect for Agg Battery (shooting). He is also wanted for questioning in 2 homicides
- Surveillance of associate of suspect wanted in a shooting and for questioning in 2 homicides. Also, he pitched a gun last week when he was chased and got away from police
- Surveillance on suspect
- Surveillance on Gang Funeral
- This is part of an on-going Firearms/Shots fired investigation

These notes provide context and highly useful details on the types of activities engaged in by officers, which are often difficult to discern from databases or Tiburon incident reports.

Information from narratives documenting 2011 CAGI NE activities

One unpublished report submitted to the PSN/CAGI steering committee by an IMPD liaison in January 2012 (*Save a Cop Statistics, unpublished word document*) documented activities of the Operation Save a Cop initiative. This project was designed to increase the number of firearms seized and increase the number of successful prosecutions of gun crime through training officers and providing equipment to support successful investigations.

The report notes that liaison training consisted of eight to ten hours of training on securing firearms to reduce loss of evidence, recovery of evidence from firearms, crime scene control, applicable federal laws, and other related issues. This training was conducted by several key local experts including the Marion County Crime Lab Director, Federal Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and

Firearms agents, IMPD officers, and representatives from the United States' Attorney's office, and the Marion County Prosecutor's office. Additional training of officers at roll call was relatively short (approximately 20 minutes) and focused on properly handling incidents, crime scenes, and evidence to increase successful firearm prosecution. The report did not disclose the specific number of officers trained, however.

The report noted that from January through June 2011 (prior to implementation) there were 135 gun cases in the NE district and 22 (16 percent) of these were not filed by the prosecutor "because of reason contributed by officers on scene." From July through December 2011, 154 gun cases were filed with only 12 (8 percent) of these not filed "because of reason contributed by officers on scene." This represents a 14 percent increase in the number of gun cases from the first half of the year to the second, and a more than a 50 percent reduction in the percentage of cases not filed by the prosecutor due to officer controlled reasons. The report also addressed an increase in gun traces from 435 in 2010 to 958 in 2011, although it was not clear if this was for NE district only or for the entire city. Federal prosecutions also increased according to the report because of sharply increased collaboration between the US Attorney's office and IMPD on gun cases.

An additional unpublished project report submitted to the PSN/CAGI steering committee in January 2012 (*PSN Finalizing Update January 19th, 2012*, unpublished document) documented the overall accomplishments of the project from the perspective of the IMPD supervisor overseeing project activities. That report noted that 30 officers had received training on firearms processing and interviewing skills. Thirty-two camera kits had been purchased (the grant application requested funding for 45). The report also notes that software licenses, G-RIDE computers, and in car video cameras had been ordered and installed, though not specifying the number of each that was purchased. The summary also describes a specific initiative targeting the Pop-It-Off Boys gang in the NE71, 72, and 73 beats. This investigation was also referenced several times in the database entries and reportedly involved 20 gang members (19 of whom were arrested for various charges). The report concludes that crime in the 42nd Street Corridor has generally trended downward following PSN/CAGI activities and includes an appendix with specific crime statistics that supports this conclusion. The report did



note, however, that homicides increased from zero to two and assaults increased from 35 to 49 from 2010 to 2011.

In terms of the directed patrol activities, the report notes that the highest performing officers were recruited to participate and that these officers were using specific intelligence to target which locations to patrol. No specific statistics were provided relating to the directed patrols but the evidence of this activity was well-documented in the databases (see tables 10 and 14).

The report also lists activities associated with a Drug Market Initiative (DMI). This was not listed in the CAGI funding proposal and appears to have been supported with PSN funds. Periodic discussions with IMPD personnel overseeing the project referenced this DMI and there is reason to believe that some of the drug investigation and arrest activities listed in tables 10 and 14 were associated with this initiative. The available documentation within the database did not tie specific enforcement activities to the source of the funding (other databases tracked the overtime slips to specific funding sources which were not available for review at the time of this report). Therefore, it is impossible to determine the extent to which specific activities listed in the database were supported with CAGI funding or PSN funding. Thus, the data may overestimate the specific impact of CAGI dollar expenditures in terms of overtime and arrests.

Overall assessment of CAGI NE district activities

The documentation provided to CCJR researchers associated with the project (database and narrative information) suggests that NE district IMPD officers engaged in activities consistent with the grant application. The grant application, as well as several discussions with IMPD personnel, made it clear that this was a multi-faceted multi-goal approach to reducing serious gun and gang crime within the NE district. Indeed, knowledge of best practices for policing nationwide suggests that the approach taken in this district involved cutting edge initiatives. For example, the CAGI grant application does not focus on domestic violence issues beyond a single reference to continuing prevention efforts. However, during the course of the project a major initiative was conceived to proactively target repeat domestic violence offenders and to warn them that they were being monitored and that any additional violence would be dealt with

to the fullest extent of the law. This idea was labeled the Baker One project and was modeled after a similar program in Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Implementation of this occurred at the same time as other activities but there did not appear to be overtime dollars expended on the activity. There were a few mentions of activities likely consistent with this initiative (22 domestic checks, 7 problem domestic contacts) in the database and less than 1 percent of overtime hours were listed as associated with Baker One. Although it does not appear that many CAGI dollars were expended on this activity, it is clear that the grant allowed for creative thinking about initiatives to solve problems in the NE district.

The complex nature of these activities and the combination of CAGI and PSN funding into one grant presented some challenges in parsing out the unique activities funded by CAGI dollars or the number of arrests specifically associated with each type of activity or funding source. For example, one can infer that traffic arrests were most likely associated with directed patrols that were specifically mentioned in the CAGI grant application. In the majority of cases this was no doubt true. However, given the nature of the data collection instruments available it was not possible to ascertain this with certainty.

The combined information discussed above suggests that there was definitely a gang and gun connection to activities funded by CAGI (and PSN) grant dollars. Specifically, listed were 61 gang contacts, 6 specific gang charges, 19 suspected Pop-It-Off Boys gang members arrested, as well as reference to problems caused by 10 Monkey Squad gang members at the library which led to the arrest of three. With respect to gun crime, there is certainly evidence that gun crime received greater focus in the NE district due to the grant. Specifically, one report mentioned that 30 officers received training, and the database noted some overtime associated with this activity. These numbers might underestimate the additional training received in the NE district because training that occurred without the use of grant funds appears not to have been recorded. Evidence does suggest an increase in the number of firearms seized in the second half of 2011 and a sharp decrease in the number of firearms cases that could not proceed due to evidence problems caused by officer-related factors. There is also evidence that the grant enabled the development of a revised firearms investigation protocol that was first implemented in the NE district, which was to be implemented citywide.

INDIANAPOLIS CAGI PREVENTION/ INTERVENTION INITIATIVES

The primary goal of the CAGI prevention/intervention program was the reduction of youth gang activity by providing services to gang-involved or at-risk youth in targeted zip codes. As stated in the CAGI proposal (*Indianapolis, Indiana Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Proposal*, submitted to DOJ, April 2007), funding was to “support comprehensive prevention efforts that focus on addressing the full range of personal, family, and community factors that contribute to juvenile delinquency and gang activity,” with a specific goal of reducing “the occurrence of youth gang crime and precursor gang crime incidents, and to increase positive outcomes for youth at high risk for gang involvement through targeted, evidence-based gang prevention.”


The following discussion of the CAGI prevention/intervention initiative includes an overview of the 2009-2010 program activities, description of the research methodology and activities CCJR conducted, data collected, results of the evaluation, and recommendations. A brief synopsis of 2010-2012 prevention/intervention efforts involving five community gang summits also is included below.

Indianapolis CAGI Prevention/Intervention Program Implementation, 2009-2010

The crime prevention component of the CAGI proposal spelled out both prevention and intervention approaches. Gang prevention activities were to target children ages 7 to 13 years. Under this portion of the program, both in- and after-school programs were to be funded. Intervention activities were to focus on youth ages 14 to 18 years. The Steering Committee concentrated initiative resources on areas defined as high crime areas in Marion County with elevated predispositions for gang activity, based upon the type of crimes committed (drug crimes, crimes involving guns or other weapons, and other crimes of violence) and investigations that documented gang activity. To begin identifying specific targets area, for the proposal to DOJ, the prevention and reentry subcommittees identified faith-based and community organizations and schools with which they could potentially partner. Juvenile Court and the Indiana Department of Correction provided assistance by identifying youth probationers or offenders who would benefit from grant-funded programs. Both subcommittees decided to set their boundaries, at

the time of the CAGI proposal submission to DOJ, based on Indianapolis area zip codes 46201, 46208, 46218, 46222, and 46224, located on the east and west sides of the city (see Map E).

Map E: CAGI Indianapolis prevention/intervention initiative target zip codes



CAGI prevention/intervention providers

The Prevention/Intervention Subcommittee was charged with identifying programs that would work to either prevent at-risk youth (18 years and younger) from becoming involved with gang activity and/or intervening with youth that appeared to already be gang involved. Grants were awarded for the two one-year cycles: September 30, 2008 through October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2009 through October 1, 2010. Overall, the CAGI prevention/intervention initiative contracted with six providers (one of which was a subcontractor in the first year) to provide an array of services to at-risk and gang-involved youth. The six providers fell into three broad categories—community-based (3 programs), court-referral-based (2 programs), and school-based (1 program). The types of services offered by the providers varied greatly and detailed program descriptions are provided in the previously published prevention/intervention evaluation report.



Evaluation Strategy

The main goal of the CCJR prevention/intervention evaluation was to assess the impact of 2009-2010 CAGI programming that was aimed at reducing youth gang activity among gang-involved or at-risk youth in target zip codes.

The strongest research design to evaluate the impact of a program is random assignment of participants to a treatment and control group. The lack of random assignment precluded the identification of a relevant comparison group of youth not receiving program services with which to compare outcomes. Therefore, CCJR researchers proposed to examine the impact of CAGI prevention/intervention programming by examining change over time within individual CAGI prevention/intervention participants across a range of factors, including the following:

- gang risk/activity level
- crime/delinquency
- school attendance, performance, and disciplinary actions
- quality of social peer contacts
- attitudes toward crime and gangs

A major challenge to the CAGI prevention/intervention initiative and to CCJR evaluation efforts was the issue of programs being sparsely populated for several providers during the first few months at the start of CAGI programming. Additional details of these challenges are provided in the original prevention/intervention evaluation report. To increase program participation by at-risk youth, it was determined that providers from the community- or school-based programs would assist with identifying youth who were at risk for gang involvement and therefore eligible for potential participation in the program. The expansion of program eligibility involved three of the six providers identifying potential participants based on provider assessments of individual youth gang risk or involvement. Following the expansion in program eligibility to include provider-based referrals, all six providers reported operating at or near full capacity.

The CCJR evaluation provided analyses of data from three sources: youth participants (pre- and post-surveys), providers (intake and exit forms), and juvenile justice data from the Quest database. The youth pre-program and post-program instruments were designed to measure changes in youth attitudes and behaviors following CAGI programming. The provider intake and exit forms that were completed by program staff addressed observations of youth participants' gang risk or involvement.

Data extracts from the Quest Case Management System Database provided CCJR with participant-level information on criminal/delinquency history that included prior and recent arrests as well as offense type and severity. All three data sources will be discussed in further detail below.

Data analysis and results included participants' attitudes and behaviors as reported at the beginning of CAGI programming and change in particular attitudes at the conclusion/after several months of programming, and involvement in the juvenile justice system.

Participant data

To evaluate the programs, CCJR employed a pre/post survey approach to measure changes in participants' and providers' perceptions and attitudes following CAGI programming. Due to concerns expressed by the Steering Committee that that questions originally developed by CCJR were overly invasive, the resulting surveys contained no direct self-reported indicators of gang involvement by youth. The participant pre-program survey consisted of 22 questions and addressed school experience, attitudes towards crime/gangs, living situation, family history of incarceration, and peer relationships. The questions were designed to obtain an overview of the level of risk of gang involvement. The participant post-program survey consisted of 25 questions, dealing with the same topics covered in the pre-surveys. The pre- and post-surveys were completed by program participants.

Provider data

The provider intake and exit forms included more direct indicators of participating youths' gang risk or involvement. However, these indicators only included the observations of the providers and therefore only include information known to the person filling out the intake (and exit) form. The form contained 13 indicators covering gang behaviors, school problems, and criminal delinquency that providers could identify:

- Self identifies as a gang member
- Associates with or is friends with gang members
- Always "hangs" with the same group
- Has "tagged" or marked something with graffiti
- Uses overt gang handshakes, gestures, or body language



- Refers to known gangs in the neighborhood
- Has tattoos that indicate gang affiliation
- Has family members who are gang members
- Has been in physical fights
- Skips school
- Has been arrested
- Has carried a weapon
- Has used a weapon to threaten/bully someone

The provider exit form consisted of 17 questions, and was designed to mirror topics covered in the participant surveys, including provider perceptions of participants' school attendance, performance, and disciplinary actions, family relationships, pro/anti-social peer contacts, and attitudes towards crime and gangs. The intake and exit forms were completed by program staff.

Juvenile delinquency/ criminal justice system data

The Quest Case Management System Database was identified as the best source of data on juvenile court involvement among participants, specifically criminal/delinquency history, including prior offenses, recent arrests (since CAGI services were received), and offense type and severity. Developed by Gottlieb & Wertz, Inc. (G&W), and implemented with Crowe Horwath LLP, Quest is a case management and data sharing system designed specifically for the juvenile justice community, with data provided and accessed by

numerous entities, such as courts, probation officers, detention officials, clerks, prosecutors, public defenders, police, intake processing, diversion programs, and schools. The data cover arrests for youth from early 2002 through May 31, 2011.

Data collection

Beginning in January 2009, pre-program surveys were administered and provider intake forms completed for participants by program providers. Shortly after entering the program, each youth was asked to complete the pre-program survey. Providers were expected to complete intake forms and submit both surveys and forms to CAGI staff. Participant completion of both pre- and post-surveys was voluntary. Completed pre- and post-surveys, intake and exit forms were de-identified for data entry and analysis. To match pre- and post-survey instruments and to ensure respondents' anonymity, CAGI program staff devised a unique identifier (by provider and participant number) that was applied during the de-identification process to each survey and form.

Table 15 shows the number of participant surveys and provider forms required and completed overall. The total number of program participants examined is based on whether a participant pre- or post-survey or form was submitted for a single participant. As part of efforts to gather comprehensive data, CCJR and CAGI staff followed up with providers to ensure that all forms were as complete as possible for final data entry and analysis. As shown in Table 15, the overall rate of completion for intake forms was 69 percent. The rate of participant pre-program survey completion was nearly 77 percent overall.

Table 15: Provider form and participant survey completion

Surveys/forms submitted	Total	
	Count	%
Participant pre-program surveys and provider intake forms		
Pre-program participant surveys	425	76.6
Provider intake forms	384	69.2
Participant post-program surveys and provider exit forms		
Post-program participant surveys	182	32.8
Provider exit forms	373	67.2
Matching participant surveys and provider forms		
Matching pre- and post-program participant surveys	129	23.2
Matching provider intake and exit forms	350	63.1
Complete matching sets (pre, post, intake, exit)	124	22.3
Total number of participants	555	100.0

Source: CAGI prevention/intervention participant surveys and provider forms

Note: The total number of program participants is based on whether a survey/form was submitted for a single participant.



Approximately one-third of required post-surveys were administered. The rate of completion by providers of exit forms was similar to intake forms, with two-thirds submitting required materials. Overall, only 23 percent of cases included a matching pre- and post-survey. Sixty-three percent of intake and exit forms were matched. Only 22 percent of all cases included complete matching sets with a pre-survey, post-survey, intake form, and exit form for an individual participant.

At the outset of CCJR evaluation and data collection activities, having both participants and providers fill out information at both intake and following program participation was thought to enhance reliability given that participants might not be expected to be especially forthcoming regarding gang risk or involvement. However, based on results from questions on the provider exit forms that address changes in youth behavior, risk of gang involvement, attitudes regarding crime, academic performance, and peer and family relationships, a large share of providers indicated they were unaware of changes among youth risk or did not have the necessary information to make such assessments. Furthermore, when perceived changes in a youth were reported by the providers, results appeared disproportionately skewed to positively reflect on the impact of services offered.

Results

Participant program completion

Provider exit forms asked for participant program status and successful completion, but these forms were not consistently completed. Exit provider forms were only completed for 67 percent (373 of 555) program participants. Criteria for “successful” program completion varied by provider and ranged from fulfilling court-ordered requirements, to continued youth attendance and program participation, and continued participation in school-

based programming through the end of the school year. Using these broad criteria, the providers reported varying rates of enrollment and successful completion for their programs. At the time exit forms were completed, providers reported that 21 percent of participants were still enrolled in their programs.

As shown in Table 16, overall, providers reported that one-half of participants successfully completed their programs; roughly 30 percent did not successfully complete. Providers did not respond to the question about successful program completion for 20 percent of participants. Because this information was only available for two-thirds of participants, it is impossible to conclusively determine the overall success rate of the programs. Of the six CAGI prevention/intervention providers, two received nearly all of their participants via court-ordered referrals from the Juvenile Court. As shown in Table 16, fulfillment of court-ordered requirements by program participants was reported as 57 percent.

Provider information on youth gang risk, attitudes, and behaviors at intake

Overall, of the 13 possible indicators of gang risk/involvement included in the intake form, the most commonly reported indicators of gang risk or involvement were *associating with or having friends that are known gang members* (53 percent), *skipping school* (43 percent), *having been in physical fights* (38 percent), *always hanging with the same group* (35 percent), or *referring to known gangs in the neighborhood* (32 percent).

Pre-program survey data on youth gang risk, attitudes, and behaviors

Participants were asked about any family history of incarceration or exposure to violent crime. Nearly two-thirds of respondents reported having family members that have been incarcerated, and

Table 16: Participant program status

	Yes		No		No response		Total exit forms completed
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	
Is this participant still enrolled in your program?	77	20.6	291	78.0	5	1.3	373
Did he/she successfully complete your program?	191	51.2	107	28.7	75	20.1	373
Was this individual court-ordered to participate in your program?	99	26.5	243	65.1	31	8.3	373
If YES, has this participant fulfilled the court order requirement?	56	56.6	36	36.4	NA		99*

Source: Source: CAGI prevention/intervention provider forms

*The total number of participants court-ordered to participate above (99) is based on the number that responded “yes” to the preceding question (*Was this individual court-ordered to participate in your program?*).



roughly one-third indicated that a family member had committed a violent crime. Nearly 40 percent of respondents report that a family member had been the victim of a violent crime. With regard to school discipline and overall academic experience, roughly three-quarters of participants indicated they had been suspended and close to one-third (29 percent) had been expelled from school.

Survey results included the percent of participant respondents whose friends had engaged in gang activity or behaviors that place them at high risk for gang involvement. Roughly one-quarter indicated that in the last year, at least two to four of their best friends have been a member of a gang, and 13 percent reported that two to four friends had been arrested. Additionally, 46 percent had at least one friend that dropped out of school and nearly one-third had two or more friends who had been suspended or expelled from school. In response to the question, *Thinking of the (four) friends you mentioned above, how much do you agree that it is more important to "have their back" than obey the law*, 53 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to have their [friend's] back. The responses to this question are instructive in that gangs often use the logic and peer pressure that members exhibit a stronger allegiance to the group/gang than the law.

Participant criminal/juvenile delinquent history prior to CAGI participation

Participant criminal/delinquency history, including prior offenses, recent arrests (since the participants began to receive CAGI services) and offense type and offense severity were obtained from the Quest database. Among the 555 CAGI participants, 212 were located in the Quest system with at least one record of arrest prior to CAGI program participation. The number of participants without any prior arrests is indicated by the lack of any record in the Quest system. It is possible that participants could have been arrested in other jurisdictions not included in Quest.

Comparing Pre- and Post-CAGI Program Results

CCJR researchers compared pre-program survey results with post-program survey results, provider intake and exit form results, and juvenile justice contacts. Ordinarily, comparing pre- and post-data would offer insights into CAGI program effects. However, prior to discussing the specific results, it is important to consider the limitations of the data. With respect to the provider data, as noted above, there were difficulties in compiling

complete data at intake but especially on the exit forms. The match rate for this crucial piece of information was low enough to raise potential concerns. Intake and exit forms could be matched for only 63 percent of CAGI participants. The low match rate for the participant pre- and post-surveys is also a concern. Overall, less than one-quarter of youth in the CAGI programs completed both a pre- and post-program survey and this problem was endemic to all providers. Some loss of participation was to be expected for programs that were mainly comprised of voluntary participants. Yet, several of the providers defined success partly in terms of continued involvement in the program. Therefore, having post-program surveys on only 33 percent of youth certainly must temper any evidence of success discussed below.

These programs also were very different in the populations they served (some participants were voluntary while others were court-ordered), the goals of the programs, and program characteristics. Some had defined curricula that appeared to be specifically anti-gang in nature, while others appeared to have more general anti-criminal or pro-social programming. Some had defined durations and others had open-ended programming. Therefore, few comparisons can or should be made across programs.

Provider data

Participant gang risk and involvement

Figure 3 provides a comparison of gang risk behaviors based on providers' perceptions of identified indicators at the beginning of CAGI service provision and at exit. Providers were asked to indicate whether they were aware of or had observed the behavior recently (since CAGI participation began). Based on provider intake data, the most commonly reported indicators of gang risk or involvement were *associating with or having friends that are known gang members* (54 percent), *skipping school* (41 percent), *having been in physical fights* (38 percent), *always hanging with the same group* (36 percent), or *referring to known gangs in the neighborhood* (34 percent). For each gang-risk behavior except always hanging with the same group, the percentage of participants that exhibited risk behaviors fell fairly dramatically—differences that were statistically significant at the .05 level. For instance, *having been in physical fights* declined from 38 percent to 12 percent, *associates with or is friends with gang members* dropped from 54 to 33 percent, and *referring to known neighborhood gangs* fell from 34 to 17 percent.




Pre/post-CAGI programming comparisons of participant gang risk, attitudes, and behaviors

CCJR researchers conducted comparative analysis of respondents' pre/post responses to assess whether changes in attitudes occurred following CAGI programming. Table 17 illustrates participant pre-program and post-program responses regarding the number of the participant's four best friends that have engaged in gang activity or behaviors that place them at high risk for gang involvement. At the right of this table is a column which compares the percentage change from the pre- to the post-survey for each question, overall and by provider. Paired sample t-tests were performed to determine whether pre/post differences were statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. Overall, there was a statistically significant 16.3 percent reduction in the number of youth reporting that one or more of their friends had been suspended or expelled, and a small but statistically significant 4.7 percent decrease in the number of respondents reporting that their friends had dropped out of school. There was also a statistically significant drop in the overall number of participants reporting that one or more of their

friends had been arrested (8.5 percent). When comparing pre- and post-responses, the share of respondents that report that at least one of their best friends has been a member of a gang rose a statistically significant 4.7 percent—from 34 percent prior to CAGI programming to 39 percent.

In response to the question, *Thinking of the (four) friends you mentioned above, how much do you agree that it is more important to "have their back" than obey the law*, while 54 percent of participant respondents agreed or strongly agreed that it is more important to have their back than obey the law on pre-surveys, 61 percent of post-survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with that statement, an increase of 7 percentage points. Although these differences were not statistically significant, given that the programming was designed to reduce gang involvement among participants, the fact that the matched pre/post sample respondents reported an overall increase in the number of friends that were gang members is dismaying. This is especially concerning given that the matched pre/post sample respondents are likely to be the youth whom were most impacted by the programs because they were available to take both pre- and post-program surveys.

Figure 3: Gang risk behaviors that providers were aware of or have observed among participants at *Intake* and *Exit*



Source: CAGI prevention/intervention provider forms

Notes:

Providers were asked to "mark all that apply" in identifying indicators of gang risk or involvement.

With the exception of *hangs with the same group*, the difference between the provider intake and exit form results across all other indicators is statistically significant at the .05 level.



Table 17: Think of your four best friends (the friends you feel closest to). In the past year (12 months), how many of your best friends have:

	Pre-program surveys				Post-program surveys				Pre/post percent difference (A v. B)	Total matching pre- and post-survey respondents
	None		1 or more (A)		None		1 or more (B)			
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%		
Been suspended or expelled from school?	41	31.8	82	63.6	64	49.6	61	47.3	16.3%*	129
Dropped out of school?	89	69.0	32	24.8	95	73.6	26	20.2	-4.7%*	129
Been arrested?	62	48.1	59	45.7	77	59.7	48	37.2	-8.5%*	129
Been members of a gang?	76	58.9	44	34.1	76	58.9	50	38.8	4.7%*	129

Source: CAGI prevention/intervention participant surveys

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to non-responses.

* Pre/post difference is statistically significant at $p < .05$ in paired sample t-test.

Participants were asked about how the CAGI program had impacted their attitudes regarding obeying the law. Seventy-eight percent agreed or *strongly agreed* that since they began participating in the CAGI program, they were more concerned with abiding by the law than before they started the program. Nineteen percent of respondents either *disagreed* or *strongly disagreed* with the statement. This result suggests a much stronger effect of the program on general attitudes regarding law abiding behavior than gang specific attitudes (at least among youth who responded to both surveys).

Participant criminal/juvenile delinquent history post-CAGI participation

Through the Quest data, CCJR researchers analyzed information regarding arrests among participants that occurred after CAGI program start dates. In some cases, due to missing or incomplete intake forms, CCJR had to approximate program start dates based on dates of pre-program survey completion.

Table 18 compares the frequency of arrest in the pre-CAGI period overall and within two years prior to CAGI participation with post-CAGI start date arrests. Overall 58 percent (323) of youth had no arrest at any point prior to, during, or after CAGI

involvement. Thirty-eight percent (212 of 555) of youth had an arrest at some point prior to starting CAGI participation. In the two years prior to CAGI, 16 percent of CAGI youth were arrested and in the period following the start of CAGI programming, 23 percent of the sample (130 youth) were arrested. The table shows that the results depend on what time frame is considered. Comparing all pre-CAGI arrests with post-CAGI start date arrests would lead one to conclude that there was a statistically significant decrease (as shown in a paired sample to t-test, $p < .05$) in the percentage of program youth arrested following the start of the program. This might not be a fair comparison, however, given the long period of potential arrest for youth in the entire pre-CAGI period and the comparatively short post-CAGI period of exposure to potential arrest. A fairer comparison is to consider the two years immediately prior to CAGI programming (B v. C). When comparing this arrest rate, the picture was different. There was a statistically significant ($p < .05$) increase in the percentage of youth arrested from the two- year pre-CAGI period to the period post-CAGI start date. These results are certainly troubling and temper any conclusions regarding the positive impacts of CAGI programming on youth. Unfortunately, the nature of the current data did not permit full examination of these issues.

Table 18: Comparison of percentage of youth arrested, pre- and post-CAGI

	Youth with arrest prior to CAGI		Youth with arrest in two years pre-CAGI		Youth with arrest post-CAGI start date		Percentage difference for entire pre-CAGI period v. post arrest	Percentage difference for two year pre-CAGI period v. post arrest
	A		B		C		A v. C	B v. C
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	pct difference	pct. difference
Total (N=555)	212	38.0%	89	16.0%	130	23.0%	-15.0%*	7.0%*

Source: Quest Case Management System Database

Note: The pre-CAGI period includes dates of arrest prior to CAGI program start dates. The post-CAGI includes dates of arrest since participant approximate CAGI program start date (by available dates on intake forms or pre-surveys). Prior arrest history goes back to 1/4/2002, for one participant. Most recent Quest arrest information was gathered through 5/31/2011.

* Difference significant at $p < .05$ in paired sample t-test.



Assessment of the Impact of CAGI Prevention/Intervention Programming, 2009-2010

While evidence of overall program impact was mixed, the preceding comparison of participant and provider data pointed to some positive results, highlighted below:

- With the majority of gang-risk indicators observed by providers, the percentage of participants that exhibited risk behaviors fell fairly dramatically. Reported gang-risk indicators with the steepest declines between intake and exit included skips school (31 percent reduction), *having been in physical fights* (26 percent decline), *associating with or being friends with gang members* (21 percent decrease), and *referring to known neighborhood gangs* (17 percent drop).
- A majority (78 percent) of respondents conveyed that since they began CAGI, they were more concerned with obeying the law. Over one-half (60 percent) also reported that they have been *somewhat or a lot less* involved in activities that could get them in trouble.
- For the 129 youth who responded to both the pre- and post-survey, there was a statistically significant reduction in the percentage of youth reporting that one or more of their friends had been arrested, suspended or expelled, or dropped out of school.
- Overall, 323 youth (58 percent) were never arrested at any point prior to or subsequent to their involvement with the CAGI program. It seems reasonable to conclude that some number of these youth might have been arrested but for their involvement with CAGI programming. Unfortunately, it was impossible to quantify the number of youth for whom this might be true given the available data.

Results that represent some concern in terms of 2009-2010 program impact include the following:

- For the matched pre/post survey respondents, overall, there was a statistically significant 5 percent increase in the percentage of respondents that indicated that at least one of their best friends had been a member of a gang. Additionally, 54 percent of participant respondents on pre-surveys conveyed that allegiance to friends was more important than obeying the law, compared with 61 percent of respondents on post-surveys.
- Many youth reported little or no change in their attitudes about gangs. In response to a

question about attitudes toward gangs since beginning the CAGI program, less than half (45 percent) of participants said that they viewed gangs more negatively and one-half indicated that their attitudes remained constant. A minority (34 percent) of respondents reported worrying somewhat or a lot less about their friends getting them into trouble.

- When comparing arrest outcomes, there was a statistically significant 7.0 percent increase in the overall number of youth arrested following the start of CAGI, compared with the two years pre-CAGI.
- Overall there was a statistically significant 1.7 percent increase in the number of felonies subsequent to the start of CAGI programming as compared with the immediate two years prior to the start of CAGI programming.

Lessons Learned

There were clear challenges associated with implementation of CAGI prevention/intervention initiatives that are more fully addressed in the original report. The specification of the five zip codes in the application to DOJ proved to be overly restrictive when combined with the need to fill programs with court-ordered youth. Although necessary in this case, relying on providers to refer participants to their own programs raises concerns of bias both in identifying participants as well as self-assessments of participant outcomes following programming.

The determination of providers also raised complex questions. Eight local organizations submitted proposals and five were initially accepted (Hawthorne went from a subcontractor to an independent grantee in year two). Some of these programs proposed specific anti-gang curricula, whereas others had much more general pro-social or anti-crime programming. It remains unclear to what extent these programs were explicitly anti-gang in nature and this is perhaps reflected in the limited changes in attitudes on gangs shown in the post-program surveys.

Data collection efforts by CCJR researchers also were challenging. CCJR researchers were not involved in the project until after the grant was approved and had limited interaction with the project prior to the selection of providers. The wide variation in program goals, characteristics, and definitions of success made measurement of success difficult, especially after random assignment by the courts was determined not to be feasible. Another



major challenge was the inability to ask direct questions of participants about their gang activity. This meant that only attitudinal measures and very indirect indicators of gang risk could be assessed. Since these measures are indirect indicators, interpretation becomes less clear.

Another challenge was the reliance on providers to administer pre- and post-program surveys and complete intake and exit forms. Although this was a reasonable decision, it led to issues with comprehensive data collection that resulted in incomplete survey/form administration and completion.

Personnel transitions both at the CAGI program staff level and among provider staff also posed significant challenges to comprehensive data collection. Although perhaps unavoidable, these transitions impacted the degree to which comprehensive data could be collected from CAGI participants and providers, as well as tracking participants' progress through the various programs

Prevention/Intervention 2010-2012: Gang Summits

As part of CAGI Prevention/Intervention programming, five conferences were sponsored between November 2010 and March 2012. CCJR was involved in designing conference evaluation forms for each of the five events. CCJR researchers drafted the initial conference survey instrument. Upon review by members of the prevention/intervention committee, revised versions were provided to conference organizers. In general, the surveys were administered at the conclusion of each conference. Completed surveys were submitted to CCJR for

data entry, analysis, and reporting of results. The primary objective of the summits was to make community members aware of the gang issue, increase understanding of various aspects regarding gang risk and involvement, and provide participants with information about available resources to address local gang concerns.


Five gang summits were held over 16 months, aimed at various community members, with varying number of survey respondents, as follows:

- November 6, 2010, for community residents and leaders, 48 surveys
- April 9, 2011, for community residents and leaders, 57 surveys
- September 23, 2011, for school personnel, 69 surveys
- March 3, 2012, for community residents and faith-based leaders, 19 surveys
- March 5, 2012, for Latino community, 16 surveys

The events intended for community residents, included parents and guardians of youth at-risk of gang involvement, as well as community leaders concerned about gang activity. Full reports with results from the fourth and fifth conferences are included as appendices in this report.

Results from all five conferences indicate that the responses from participants that completed the surveys were overwhelmingly positive. Specific sessions that were offered at one or more of the five events included *Gangs: What do you need to know*, *Indianapolis Gang and Awareness Overview*, and *Online Social Networking*. A substantial

Figure 4: Participant session ratings, November 2010, April 2011, and September 2012 conferences





majority of respondents from all conferences rated the sessions offered as useful to them. Figure 4 illustrates participant session ratings across the first three conferences.

Among participants that completed surveys, it appears that satisfaction with the three conferences rose, most dramatically for *Online Social Networking* between the first two summits and remained high for the third event. The moderate decline for the *Indianapolis Gang Overview* session offered at the third conference (for school personnel) may have been the result of different audiences. Most respondents also indicated that their understanding and awareness of gangs increased, as did their comfort level with contacting community leaders, law enforcement, and

local youth-serving agencies regarding gang-related matters. In addition, the vast majority of respondents from all five events would recommend the program to others. Conference participants also were given the opportunity to provide feedback. A substantial share of respondents from all five events offered input regarding additional gang-related topics for future programs and perspectives on specific resources, including individual actions, needed to confront the issue of gangs in the community. Respondents expressed a need for or interest in receiving information about specific gangs in the area, as well as prevention and intervention techniques. Similarly, participants cited opportunities for broader community engagement and law enforcement approaches.



INDIANAPOLIS CAGI REENTRY INITIATIVES

The primary goal of the CAGI Reentry program was to provide services to assist formerly incarcerated individuals with ties to gangs to refrain from criminal activity and avoid gang involvement. The pool of potential program participants was ex-offenders returning to targeted zip codes within Marion County from an Indiana state correctional facility. As stated in the CAGI proposal (*Indianapolis, Indiana Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Proposal*, submitted to DOJ, April 2007), funding was to support “reentry assistance programs for formerly incarcerated individuals who are identified as present gang members or are at risk for future gang involvement.”

This following discussion of the CAGI reentry initiative includes an overview of the 2009-2010 program activities, description of the research methodology and activities CCJR conducted, data collected, results of the evaluation, and recommendations. CCJR also conducted an assessment of a transitional jobs program—Keys to Work—that was funded in 2011-2012 with CAGI reentry funds. Results of that assessment also are included in the discussion.

Indianapolis CAGI Reentry Program Implementation, 2009-2010

The DOJ proposal outlined an approach to preventing recidivism that would utilize faith-based and community organizations, pre-release assessment and services, intensive community-based supervision and comprehensive community support to facilitate reintegration.

As stated in the proposal, the committee set a goal of reaching 100 high-impact gang members throughout the three-year award period. The goal of the network of service agencies and individual providers was to offer a range of services to assist the returning person in a successful re-integration into the community. Funding these partnerships would establish or enhance services that provide transitional housing, job readiness and placement assistance, and treatment of substance abuse and mental health.

With respect to a geographic service area, the steering committee concentrated CAGI resources on areas defined as high crime areas in Marion County with elevated predispositions for gang activity, based upon the type of crimes committed (drug crimes, crimes involving guns or other weapons, and other crimes of violence) and investigations that documented gang activity. To begin identifying specific target areas for the DOJ proposal, the Prevention and Reentry subcommit-

tees identified faith-based and community organizations and schools with which they could potentially partner. Both subcommittees decided to set their boundaries, at the time of the CAGI proposal submission to DOJ, based on Indianapolis area zip codes 46201, 46208, 46218, 46222, and 46224, located on the east and west sides of the city (see Map 1).

CAGI reentry providers

The CAGI reentry initiative contracted with two primary providers to provide an array of service to program participants. Forest Manor Multi-Service Center (Forest Manor) served as the CAGI reentry eastside provider. For most of the program period, Bethlehem House offered services for the west side participants. Grants were awarded for two one-year cycles: September 30, 2008, through October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2009, through October 1, 2010.

The Bethlehem House has a history of providing services to “indigent substance abusers and persons living with HIV or AIDS who face homelessness, mental illness, or a history of incarceration” (Bethlehem House Proposal, September 2008). Services that Bethlehem House offers include one-on-one counseling, substance abuse and community support groups, and transportation. Bethlehem House proposed to establish a program specifically designed to provide holistic services to 25 offenders at a time. Forest Manor proposed to offer services in conjunction with two partners as part of a One Stop Shop. The program would provide a range of services related to work readiness, transportation assistance, mental health and substance abuse treatment, and housing assistance.

Evaluation Strategy

The goal of the CCJR reentry evaluation was to evaluate the impact of CAGI programming on offenders with gang ties or deemed to be at high risk of gang activity. In the absence of random assignment, one can evaluate the impact of a program through a comparison group design. In this approach, an appropriate comparison group not receiving CAGI programming is identified. The identification of a relevant comparison group of offenders not receiving program services with which to compare outcomes presented somewhat of a challenge. Details of comparison group selection and characteristics are discussed below.



Data collection

CCJR researchers worked closely with CAGI staff to identify key variables, including demographic indicators, criminal history, program intervention, results, and new offense data, and develop a mechanism to collect comprehensive participant-level information, including participant background information and progress through CAGI programs—services received, program compliance, and completion. The data were gathered by CAGI staff from a number of sources, including parole and probation officers, offender pre-sentencing investigation (PSI) reports, CAGI reentry program providers and case managers, and the court. CAGI participant-level data regarding most recent incarcerations was provided by the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC). IDOC also provided the project with a dataset of offenders released under similar parameters to the CAGI group from which to generate a comparison group.

New arrest and conviction data were obtained from Marion County's Justis system. The date, nature of the charge at arrest, and its associated felony or misdemeanor level was recorded for each arrest incidence. Similar information was recorded for each conviction. This procedure successfully identified all those with new arrests or convictions since beginning the CAGI program through July 1, 2011, with one exception. One CAGI participant was not able to be identified within the Justis system and is therefore excluded from the outcome tables.

Data analysis and reporting addressed the following information:

- Demographic characteristics, including age, race, and gang risk/involvement
- Criminal and incarceration history, including recent and most serious past offenses, felony charges, sentence information, and parole or probation release background and conditions
- Participant progress through CAGI reentry programs, including services received, program compliance, and completion
- Participant recidivism (re-arrests, charges, and convictions, including gang specific information when available, and technical violations) from the time of release from IDOC through July 1, 2011
- CAGI participant recidivism compared to a relevant comparison group

Challenges in program administration

A major challenge to the CAGI reentry initiative and to CCJR evaluation efforts was the issue of programs being sparsely populated during the first few months at the start of CAGI programming. The number of potential participants that would be made available based upon age, zip code, release to probation and gang affiliated designation by IDOC did not produce an adequate

Table 19: CAGI reentry participant demographic attributes

Age	All	
	Count	%
20 or younger	7	10.1
21-24	20	29.0
25-29	33	47.8
30 or older	9	13.0
Total participants	69	100.0
Race/ethnicity	All	
	Count	%
African American/black	63	91.3
Caucasian/white	5	7.2
Hispanic	1	1.4
Total participants	69	100.0
Education (IDOC Academic Codes)	All	
	Count	%
Post secondary (A)	1	1.4
High School diploma or GED (B)	33	47.8
Literacy level grade 6 or higher (C)	10	14.5
Refused testing (F)	10	14.5
Qualified for literacy skills/life skills (G)	13	18.8
Unknown	2	2.9
Total participants	69	100.0

Source: CAGI Reentry Participant Information Tracking Log

Note: Age at CAGI program start date provided by CAGI staff.



number of possible candidates. Additional details of these challenges are provided in the reentry report.

The original age range requirements also were adjusted, with approval from the Steering Committee, to an upper limit of 35 years. Once the referral process and program eligibility guidelines were amended, potential CAGI participants were identified based on parole and probation (very limited) staff recommendations that took into account age, target zip codes, and gang risk. The screening process also involved CAGI staff input (in consultation with parole and probation officers) when reviewing a potential candidate's appropriateness for program. Parole and probation officers were charged with identifying potential participant gang risk or affiliation.

Participant data

Between March 1, 2009, and May 31, 2010, 69 individuals were referred from parole (61) and probation (8) to the CAGI reentry program. As previously noted, eligibility for program participation was based on age (19 to 35 years of age), res-

idence in a target CAGI zip code, and risk of gang involvement.

Participant profiles

The average age of participants at program entry was 26 years. As shown in Table 19, most (91 percent) of the participants were African American, five were Caucasian, and one was Hispanic. Overall, close to 50 percent of CAGI participants had a high school diploma or GED.

Information regarding individual participant risk of gang involvement was gathered by CAGI staff from parole and probation officers. As Table 20 demonstrates, 90 percent of participants (62 out of 69) had a history of gang involvement, with specific gang affiliation provided. In addition, 67 percent had family or friends associated with gangs, 45 percent possessed gang tattoos, 17 percent had been observed wearing gang-specific clothing, and 15 percent were self-identified gang members. Overall, these gang-related indicators demonstrate that the program served participants who either had a specific history of gang affiliation or were at high risk of gang involvement.

Table 20: CAGI reentry participant indicators of gang risk and involvement

Indicators of gang risk/involvement	All	
	Count	%
History of gang involvement (specific gangs identified)	62	89.9
Family and/or friends associated with gangs	46	66.7
Tattoos	31	44.9
Gang clothing	12	17.4
Self-identified gang member	10	14.5
Total participants	69	
Specific gangs identified	Count	%
Gangster Disciples	17	24.6
Vice Lords	10	14.5
42nd and Post (Four Deuce)	9	13.0
Dirty Side Boyz	5	7.2
10th Street Hustler	3	4.3
34th Street	3	4.3
Other gangs	15	21.7
Gang name not indicated	7	10.1
Total participants	69	100.0

Source: CAGI Reentry Participant Information Tracking Log (compiled by CAGI staff from parole and probation officers)

Notes: Multiple indicators of gang risk and involvement may have been identified per participant so percentages will not sum to 100.

Other gangs identified include *Aryan Nation*, *Gary (IN) Bronx*, *38th Street*, *Bloods*, *Bronx Boys*, *Brown Pride/Sur 13*, *Crips*, *Haughville Syndicate*, *Hatian Mafia*, *Eastside Clips*, and *West Side Boyz*.



Participant prior offense history

As part of the overall data collection process, criminal and incarceration histories were requested from and provided by the IDOC. The participant-level information provided to CCJR researchers included the most recent offenses for which the participants were incarcerated, length of sentence, and prior convictions and offenses. As shown in Table 21, the majority of (78 percent) most recent incarcerations were for single charges with 22 percent having multiple charges listed. The most common recent offenses were drug-related (32 percent), followed by violent crimes (28 percent), and property crimes (20 percent). Only one participant was incarcerated for criminal gang activity. With regard to current offense severity, 38 percent of participants had class B felonies. Thirty percent had class D felonies, slightly more than one-quarter had class C felonies, and four percent had class A felonies.

Based on participant criminal history information provided by IDOC, a large share of CAGI participants (42 percent) had at least one prior conviction. Roughly one-quarter had no priors, while 28 percent had two or three prior conviction. The average number of prior convictions among the participants was 1.3.

Comparison group

Because efforts to identify an appropriate comparison group from the Marion Reentry County database proved unsuccessful, in December 2010, CCJR researchers approached IDOC with a request to generate a comparison group based on the following broad parameters: male offenders ages 19 to 35 (at the time of release) released from IDOC to Marion County between January 1, 2009 and May 31, 2010. IDOC was able to assist the project and provided a list of 1,080 offender releases based on these parameters that included demographic information (race/ethnicity, age at release, basic educational attainment information) and offense data, including most serious offenses and felony level. From the data provided by IDOC, CCJR researchers were able to generate a one-to-one matched comparison group based on offenders' race/ethnicity, age at release from IDOC, most serious current offense type, offense severity (felony level), and education level as reported by IDOC (see Table 22).

2009-2010 Reentry Program Results

Participant program status

As shown in Table 23, 28 participants (41 percent) graduated from the CAGI program. Graduation from the program required a participant to remain

Table 21: CAGI reentry participants' most recent incarcerations

Most recent offenses	All	
	Count	%
Single charge	54	78.3
Multiple charges	15	21.7
Total participants	69	100.0
Types of offenses	Count	%
Drug-related	32	37.2
Violent crime	24	27.9
Property crime	17	19.8
Criminal gang activity	1	1.2
Other	12	14.0
Total number of offenses	86	100.0
Convictions (most serious offense)	Count	%
A felony	3	4.3
B felony	26	37.7
C felony	19	27.5
D felony	21	30.4
Total participants	69	100.0
Type of release	Count	%
Parole	61	88.4
Probation	8	11.6
Total participants	69	100.0

Source: Indiana Department of Correction



in compliance with the assigned providers' programs by keeping appointments, bi-weekly court appearances, maintaining negative drug screen results, and either actively seeking employment or securing a job. Twenty-seven participants (39 percent) were terminated from the program. Nine participants were transferred to Judge Salinas's reentry court for service provision that better fit their needs. A few participants were transferred to different parole districts during the course of the program, and two withdrew following completion of their required parole terms.

The collection of employment data is critical as studies have shown that this factor is key in reducing the likelihood of recidivism. However, as previously noted, CCJR had concerns about the comprehensive and complete collection of these data by CAGI staff via provider interviewers. Based on information collected by CAGI staff from providers, 35 percent of all participants were reportedly employed at the conclusion of the reentry program. Providers indicated they were unaware of the employment status of approximately 20 percent of participants, and 45 percent were unemployed.

Table 22: CAGI participant and comparison group profiles and criminal history

Race/ethnicity	CAGI participants (n=69)		Comparison group (n=69)	
	Count	%	Count	%
African American/black	63	91.3	63	91.3
Caucasian/white	5	7.2	5	7.2
Hispanic	1	1.4	1	1.4
Age at release from IDOC	Count	%	Count	%
20 or younger	7	10.1	3	4.3
21-24	23	33.3	28	40.6
25-29	29	42.0	30	43.5
30 or older	10	14.5	8	11.6
Average age at release from IDOC	25.8		26.0	
Education (IDOC Academic Codes)	Count	%	Count	%
Post secondary (A)	1	1.4	2	2.9
High School diploma or GED (B)	33	47.8	30	43.5
Literacy level grade 6 or higher (C)	10	14.5	5	7.2
Testing requirement waived (E)	0	0.0	3	4.3
Refused testing (F)	10	14.5	9	13.0
Qualified for literacy skills/life skills (G)	13	18.8	18	26.1
Unknown	2	2.9	2	2.9
Convictions (most serious offense)	Count	%	Count	%
A felony	3	4.3	3	4.3
B felony	26	37.7	26	37.7
C Felony	19	27.5	19	27.5
D Felony	21	30.4	21	30.4

Source: Indiana Department of Correction

Table 23: CAGI reentry participant program status

Program Status	All	
	Count	%
Graduated	28	40.6
Terminated	27	39.1
Transferred to Reentry Court	9	13.0
Transferred to alternate parole district	3	4.3
Withdrew from program following completion of required parole term	2	2.9
Total participants	69	100.0

Source: CAGI Reentry Participant Information Tracking Log (compiled by CAGI staff)



Participant and comparison group recidivism

Data were collected from the Justis system regarding new arrests among CAGI participants and comparison group individuals. Based on the data collected, 53 of 68 (78 percent) of CAGI participants had a new arrest. Among the comparison group, two-thirds (46 out of 69) were re-arrested between release from IDOC and the date of data collection (July 1, 2011). There was no statistically significant difference between in the two groups in the likelihood of re-arrest.

The mean number of new arrests was higher for CAGI participants (1.96) than among the comparison group (1.65), but there was not a statistically significant difference. Fifteen of CAGI participants were not arrested for new crimes during the period between release from IDOC and July 1, 2011, compared with 23 individuals in the comparison group. While CAGI participants had a higher rate of re-arrest overall, the distribution in terms of number of new arrests did not differ greatly between the two groups, and the differences were not statistically meaningful.

CCJR researchers examined the percent of CAGI participants and comparison group members with new convictions or cases pending. Two-thirds of CAGI participants had a new conviction or case pending against them. A slightly lower percentage of the comparison group (58 percent) had a pending case or new conviction. The difference in the likelihood of no new conviction between

CAGI participants and individuals in the comparison group was not statistically significant.

Table 24 presents the level of most serious convictions as well as pending and dismissed cases. Thirty-five percent (24 out of 68) of CAGI participants were convicted on felony charges and 18 of 69 (26 percent) individuals from the comparison group were convicted at the felony level. Among CAGI participants, 13 (19 percent) were convicted at the misdemeanor level and 10 (15 percent) comparison group offenders were convicted at this level. Twelve percent (8 out of 68) of cases among CAGI participants and 17 percent (12 out of 69) of comparison group members were pending at the time of data collection. Similarly, 12 percent of CAGI participant cases were dismissed and nine percent of comparison group cases were dismissed. The average number of cases among the CAGI participants was 3.28 and 2.98 among the comparison group members. The mean number of cases per individual was not statistically different between the two groups.

The rate of new felony convictions or cases pending was slightly higher among the comparison group (44 percent) than CAGI participants (40 percent). Sixty percent of CAGI individuals did not have a new felony conviction or case pending against them, compared to 57 percent of the comparison group who did not. There was no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of having no new felony convictions between CAGI participants and the comparison group.

Table 24: Level of most serious new conviction

Outcome/conviction level	CAGI Participants		Comparison group		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Felony	24	35.3	18	26.1	42	30.7
Misdemeanor	13	19.1	10	14.5	23	16.8
Pending	8	11.8	12	17.4	20	14.6
Dismissed	8	11.8	6	8.7	14	10.2
No new case	15	22.1	23	33.3	38	27.7
Total	68*	100.0	69	100.0	137	100.0
Average Number of cases**	3.28		2.98			

Source: Justis Database

Notes: Does not include parole or probation violations only arrests for new crimes.

*One CAGI participant was unable to be located in the Justis database and therefore is not included in these tables.

**Mean number of separate cases in Justis system per individual not statistically significantly different between CAGI participants and comparison group in an independent sample t-test at .05 level.



Assessment of the Impact of CAGI Reentry Initiative, 2009-2010

- With respect to the target population served by the CAGI program, gang indicators demonstrate that the program served participants who either had a specific history of gang affiliation or were at high risk of gang involvement. Ninety percent of participants (62 out of 69) had a history of gang involvement, with specific gang affiliation provided.
- The most common type of prior offenses among participants was drug-related. Only one participant was charged with criminal gang activity. A large share of CAGI participants (42 percent) had at least one prior conviction. Roughly one-quarter had no prior offenses, while 28 percent had two or three prior convictions.
- Overall, 41 percent of participants (28 or 69) graduated from the CAGI program. Twenty-seven participants (39 percent) were terminated from the program. Nine participants were transferred to reentry court; three participants were transferred to alternate parole districts, and two withdrew following completion of required parole terms.
- Based on the Justis data collected, 53 of 68 (78 percent) of CAGI participants had a new arrest. Among the comparison group, two-thirds (46 out of 69) were re-arrested between release from IDOC and the date of data collection. There were no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of re-arrest between the CAGI and comparison groups.
- Fifty-seven percent (39 of 68) of CAGI participants were arrested for new felony charges and 14 of 68 (21 percent) on new misdemeanor charges. The overall rate of felony arrests was nearly identical among comparison group individuals—55 percent. However, in the absence of any data regarding services received by individuals in the comparison group, caution should be taken in drawing conclusions regarding re-arrest and conviction outcomes.
- A higher percentage of CAGI participants (35 percent) were convicted on felony charges than individuals from the comparison group (26 percent). Based on CCJR analysis, there were no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of re-arrest or conviction between the CAGI and comparison groups.

Lessons Learned

There were clear challenges associated with implementation of CAGI reentry initiatives. The specification of the five zip codes in the application to DOJ proved to be overly restrictive. In addition, the issues with identifying potential candidates with gang affiliation or at risk of gang involvement pre-release from IDOC and problems with populating the program with offenders on probation presented difficulties in fully-populating the program early on.

Data collection efforts by CCJR were also problematic. CCJR researchers were not involved in the project until after the grant was approved and had limited interaction with the project prior to the selection of providers. However, CCJR researchers were able to establish a means for participant-level data collection with CAGI staff to initiate the collection process. Personnel transitions both at the CAGI program staff level and among provider staff also posed significant challenges to comprehensive data collection.

Establishing a comparison group also proved to be difficult for CCJR. Only after repeated attempts over the course of more than one year, were researchers able to generate a group, with the assistance of IDOC, based on CAGI program parameters and participant factors for comparison. Given the lack of information regarding which members of the comparison group, if any, received services and the nature of those services, it is difficult to fully evaluate the CAGI program and draw conclusions.

Transitions at the provider-level also posed challenges with the need to identify a new primary provider and the attendant need to collect comprehensive data. Provider and personnel transitions, while unavoidable, also presented problems for comprehensive data collection as new staff were likely unaware of complete participant-level information such as services received and outcomes such as employment status at program conclusion.

Summary of Keys to Work Transitional Jobs Program, 2011-2012

Program description

In the last year of the overall CAGI initiative, the steering committee set aside funds for a transitional employment effort. Such programs offer temporary, subsidized employment to those who lack work experience, training, or education. Jobs are typically designed for those with barriers to employment, such as substance abuse, homeless-



ness, or a criminal record. Keys to Work (KTW) received CAGI funds to support a transitional jobs project for “offenders between 19 and 29 years of age with an identified gang affiliation in Marion County, documented criminal history, and the propensity to recidivate” (Keys to Work PSN/CAGI Proposal, fall 2011). The purpose and target of the program fit well with the overarching goal of the CAGI reentry initiative of providing services to assist formerly incarcerated individuals with ties to gangs to refrain from criminal activity and avoid gang involvement. KTW’s proposal included the goal of identifying seven potential candidates for participation and provision of the following services:

- Job skills training
- General Education Development (GED) services
- Identify transitional job opportunities for participants

- Wrap-around support services, including case management, drug testing, and financial management techniques
- Barrier buster-funded services, including rental assistance, transportation support (e.g., bus passes and gas cards), obtaining driver’s licenses, minor car repair, food/personal item vouchers, tattoo removal, and dental work

KTW received a grant of \$72,657 for November 1, 2011, through March 31, 2012. Reports from both the KTW project coordinator and ICJI staff suggest that KTW expended all CAGI funds during the project period.

Program assessment

In mid-January, CCJR (and a Prevention/Intervention committee member and ICJI staff member) met with KTW staff regarding participant progress through the program. Based on the

Table 25: Keys to Work participant demographics, gang risk indicators, program status and services received

	Number of participants	%
Gang risk indicators (N=8)		
Friends or family associated with gangs	5	62.5%
Has tattoos	8	100.0%
Self-identified gang member	8	100.0%
Average age among eligible participants (N=13)	24.6 years	NA
Educational attainment prior to program (N=13)		
Less than highschool	9	69.2%
Highschool/GED	4	30.8%
Referral source (N=13)		
Stop the Violence	7	53.8%
Faith-based organization	2	15.4%
Weed and Seed	1	7.7%
Workforce Inc.	1	7.7%
Keys to Work	2	15.4%
Program status (N=13)		
Received services through end of program	7	53.8%
Terminated	1	7.7%
Eligible but did not receive services	5	38.5%
Average length of program participation (N=8)	4.3 months	NA
Services provided (N=8)		
Case management	8	100.0%
Employment intake assessment	8	100.0%
Job training	8	100.0%
Job placement	8	100.0%
Housing assistance	4	50.0%
Education	5	62.5%
Transportation	8	100.0%
Permanent job placement (N=8)	3	37.5%

Source: Keys to Work staff reporting



proposal and information seen as key for assessment, CCJR set up a data entry mechanism for KTW staff to provide de-identified individual participant information for analysis. On March 14, 2012, researchers met with KTW staff to review the data entry tool. Information to be collected included: age, program start and end date, program status (currently receiving services, terminated, or eligible for participation), educational attainment prior to program start, gang risk indicators, services provided (case management, employment intake, job training and placement, housing assistance, education assistance, transportation assistance, and various barrier buster-funded services), employment status at conclusion of program, and arrest during program participation (see Table 25). Once data were entered by KTW staff, some follow up with the provider was required to verify the information supplied. Data collection by the provider was finalized April 2, 2012. This summary includes an analysis of those data.

Program participants

In their proposal, KTW indicated that 13 eligible candidates had been identified for possible participation. The average age of the 13 eligible participants at the time the program began was 25 years. Eligible participants ranged in age from 18 to 30 years. Among the eight that went on to receive services, the mean age was 27 years. Among the eligible participants, four were high school graduates or possessed a GED and nine had less than a high school education. Among those who received services, four were high school graduates and four had not completed high school/GED. None of the eligible participants were employed at the time the program began.

KTW staff provided gang risk information for those offenders that began the program. Among the eight that were program participants, KTW reported that five had friends or family that were associated with gangs, all had tattoos, and all self-identified as gang members. Seven of the eight were affiliated with The Folks gang and one with the Gangster Disciples. KTW staff that completed the data collection process for CCJR were unaware of gang risk factors associated with those participants that were eligible but did not participate.

Among all eligible participants, two were referred from ministers or faith-based organizations, two from Keys to Work, seven from the program Stop the Violence, one from a Weed and Seed program

and one from Workforce Inc. Among the participants that received services, three were referred from Stop the Violence, two from Keys to Work, and one from Weed and Seed, one from a pastor, and one from Workforce, Inc.

Results

Among the eight individuals that received services over the course of the program, six participants remained in the program for the five-month duration of the CAGI-supported project (November 4, 2011, through the end of the grant, March 31, 2012). One participant was terminated (for an inability to maintain employment and inebriation while at work) in early January and replaced with a participant from the pool of eligible candidates. This additional participant remained in the program through conclusion of the CAGI-funded project.

All participants received case management services, which included daily follow up regarding individual progress, group meetings, frequent follow up with transitional employers pertaining to client progress and any concerns, and job site visits.

Five of the eight participants received GED services. Two participants had obtained a GED while they were incarcerated. More detailed education information was not available for the remaining participant. One participant was reported enrolled in Martin University. Education services primarily included GED preparation classes in a group setting and KTW case management staff assisting participants in finding opportunities for adult literacy classes.

All participants received employment services, including intake assessment, job preparation, skills training, and transitional job placement. Intake assessments involved participant completion of required paperwork and a one-on-one assessment to establish employment goals. Job preparation involved building interview skills, time management, retention and resume building, and increasing awareness of employer expectations. For the job skills training component of the program, participants attended training on forklift certification, basic first aid, working with protective equipment, and handling of hazardous waste materials.

KTW placed participants in transitional jobs at several locations. Six were assigned to work with Gleaners Food Bank, five with Trotter Construction, three with Keys to Work (two in banquet service and one as a property manager), two at the Boner Community Center, and one



with Sammy's Garage. Over the course of the program, two participants were placed at one job location, two at two locations, and three at three transitional employment locations. KTW staff reported that participants gained experience in a number of areas, including clerical work, building customer service skills, repairing computers, car repair, and forklift operation.

Four of the eight participants received housing services that included finding stable, suitable accommodation and rental payment assistance. All eight received transportation assistance, including bus passes, gas cards, and car repair. All of the participants also received financial literacy services training. This involved group sessions on *Making your Money Work* as well as one-on-one sessions regarding personal budgeting.

Barrier buster funds

As part of the information gathering process, CCJR asked KTW staff to provide barrier buster fund expenditures for each participant. The categories included in Table 26 were specified by KTW staff. As the table shows, barrier buster funds were used to support a variety of activities, including car repair, transportation assistance (bus passes and gas cards), housing support (rental assistance), clothes for work, obtaining driver's license (e.g., paying off citations), and dental work. The total amount reportedly spent on participant services was \$7,318. Barrier buster support per participant ranged from \$176 to \$1,616. The average amount of support per participant was \$915. The types of services for which the

largest amount was expended were housing (\$2,617) and car repair (\$2,044).

Overall program assessment

KTW was able to provide continuous services to six of the original seven candidates referred to the program. One individual was terminated after two months and the available spot was filled immediately with an eligible participant from the pool. This new individual remained in the program through the end of the grant period. KTW staff report that to the best of their knowledge, only two of the eight participants were arrested during the time they received services. One was arrested for a parole violation and another for a probation violation.

At the end of the grant period, six of the participants remained in the transitional job positions to which they had been assigned. One of the participants had secured full time employment, at Gleaners Food Bank. KTW staff also reported that two of the six in transitional positions had been offered permanent positions, either at their transitional job (Sammy's Garage) or with another employer (Indy WEB). Although the timeframe of the CAGI-supported program was relatively short (five months), based on KTW reporting, the provider was able to offer a range of services to program participants and to assist most in acquiring new skills and gaining valuable work experience. In addition, given the length of the project, it was not possible for CCJR to assess the long-term impact of KTW's programming on participants' employment outcomes or likelihood of recidivism.

Table 26: Keys to Work barrier buster funds spent

Participant	Car repair	Transportation	Housing	Clothes for work	Driver's license	Dental work	Total
1		\$174	\$375	\$174			\$723
2	\$544	\$120	\$515	\$100		\$29	\$1,308
3			\$537				\$537
4	\$704	\$60			\$225		\$989
5	\$480	\$303					\$783
6		\$60			\$1,125		\$1,185
7		\$30		\$146			\$176
8	\$316	\$90	\$1,190	\$20			\$1,616
Total	\$2,044	\$838	\$2,617	\$440	\$1,350	\$29	\$7,318

Source: Keys to work staff reporting



OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

From the beginning of the partnership, CCJR researchers actively consulted with the overall CAGI Steering Committee, the three subcommittees (prevention/intervention, reentry, and law enforcement), and CAGI staff on program implementation. CCJR regularly offered input on how to handle challenges regarding implementation and in particular, data needs across all three areas of the initiative. CCJR also made sustained attempts across the three areas to assist CAGI staff and various providers in identifying and gathering necessary data for evaluation of the distinct program initiatives.

The majority of findings noted and recommendations offered, in particular for prevention/intervention and reentry, pertain to 2009-2010 program and research activities. In addition to highlighting key findings from the original evaluations, this report includes new analyses across the three areas during 2011 and early 2012. Under law enforcement, this involved assessment of activities focused on the SW and NE districts; with prevention/intervention, reporting of results from two gang summits held in March 2012; and on reentry, an assessment of the Keys to Work transitional jobs program.

As previously mentioned, there were clear challenges associated with program implementation and data collection, especially in the first two years of the project. However, over the course of the project, the CAGI Steering Committee appeared to take lessons learned from such challenges into account with subsequent activities. This was evident with the prevention/intervention gang summits and increased positive participant feedback over the five conferences. While the reentry transitional jobs project was only funded for a few months, short-term results and anecdotal accounts indicate it was a somewhat effective program. Law enforcement activities and the attendant ability to collect relevant data also evolved over the course of the project. Despite these challenges, there is evidence that crime was reduced in two areas of heaviest concentration of law enforcement activities in 2009 and 2010. Law enforcement activities in 2011 also appeared to take into account information gained from previous activities to focus on highest crime areas and gang activity in both the SW and NE districts. It also is evident from informal conversations with key stakeholders that the grant allowed partnerships to be created that would otherwise not have been possible.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the lessons learned from the three initiatives, CCJR offers a number of recommendations.

- Across all three areas, CCJR strongly suggests engaging the research partner as early as possible in the research process, preferably as the grant proposal is being developed to allow for development of reliable data collection strategies prior to program implementation.

Law Enforcement

Operational issues for programs such as CAGI

1. Develop a consistent definition of gang crime, train officers on this definition and ensure systematic gang data collection.
2. Train officers on when and how to fill out gang contact sheets and ensure that they do so when appropriate.
3. When initiatives involve drug market activity, focus additional efforts on generating cases for federal prosecution. This appears to have been more of a focus in 2011 activities than in the first two years of the grant.

Information collection and research issues

4. Rather than the involved officers specifying the district office, record the actual location of activity to improve the geographical assessment of programs such as CAGI-OAI. If necessary to preserve confidentiality of investigatory information, the officer could list the district office in the incident report and maintain a separate log of locations of drug purchases that would remain confidential but could be provided to researchers.
5. Develop an accounting method to systematically show when officers are engaged in special projects such as CAGI (or PSN) and connect it to specific enforcement activity tracking for special projects. Tracking these special assignments across all IMPD districts and activities would simplify the determination of the impact of IMPD initiatives. This would also facilitate determination of which outcomes (such as arrests) were associated with which funding source. IMPD officers can be engaged in a variety of legitimate activities with more than one funding source. Parsing out the unique

impact of various expenditures becomes impossible without connecting activities with the funding.

6. Develop electronic tracking of cases to reduce time and increase accuracy, as was partially done in 2010 and more effectively done in 2011. Systematically and regularly enter information into the database. Within these databases, it would be useful to track the nature of the assignment (and funding source if overtime). Officers should also be encouraged to systematically write explanatory notes that go beyond basic statistics. These notes provide context and highly useful details on the types of activities engaged in by officers, which are often difficult to discern from databases or Tiburon incident reports.
7. For data collection efforts that rely on law enforcement officers whose primary mission is not data collection, ensure data collection instruments are in place prior to the project start date and not onerous to collect. Automate data collection if possible. IMPD would benefit from developing a universal tracking tool for projects such as these which require documentation and evaluation of law enforcement activities, arrests, prosecutions, and crime rates. Collection of data in late 2010 and especially 2011 (both NE and SW districts) was greatly enhanced by having technologically savvy officers overseeing data collection and creation of data collection tools in advance.

Prevention/Intervention and Reentry

1. Ensure at the outset of programming that program parameters are defined to allow an adequate number of program candidates (youth or offenders) to meet eligibility requirements. The original parameters and means for identifying potential participants proved overly restrictive and not feasible. This resulted in a great deal of time and effort to expand and redefine eligibility.
2. Attempt to ensure as much continuity in provider and program staff as possible. Staff transitions are to a certain degree inevitable, but these changes posed a significant challenge to overall data collection efforts.
3. For data collection efforts that rely on providers to administer surveys and gather detailed participant-level information, methods need to be devised to hold pro-



grams accountable. This suggestion refers to both the submission and completeness of required data instruments.

4. Ensure that data collection procedures for proposed metrics in subgrantee applications are described fully and that proposed performance metrics are accurately reported in semi-annual and final subgrantee reports. Future programs that involve subgrantees would be well-served by requiring that any metrics proposed by subgrantees should include a data collection plan.
5. Begin procurement of all necessary data early. Bringing the research partner on early would allow for identification of relevant data and data collection planning from the outset.
6. Continue to sponsor events such as the five prevention/intervention gang summits that raise understanding and awareness of the gang issue.
7. With regard to 2011-2012 reentry activities, consider funding additional projects such as the KTW transitional jobs program.



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