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After Action Report for the Indiana Department of Homeland Security:

FEMA Disaster #1766

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Executive Summary

This document is the after action report (AAR) for FEMA disaster #1766, which consisted of a series of severe weather events in Central and Southern Indiana between May 30, 2008 and June 9, 2008 that included significant rainfall, hail, tornadoes and straight line winds. The weather events prompted response and recovery operations by the Indiana Department of Homeland Security (IDHS) and local emergency management agencies. This report provides an analysis of IDHS response and recovery activities, with particular focus on support to local public safety agencies, first responders, and communities.

The analysis is intended to improve performance during future events. The information for the analysis was collected through a series of focus groups and interviews with representatives of IDHS, other state and federal agencies, local governments (including public safety personnel and first responders), and non-governmental organizations who participated in response and recovery efforts. The meetings were scheduled and organized by IDHS staff, and facilitated by Center for Criminal Justice Research staff, between August 29 and January 23, 2009. Individual interviews were also conducted to gain specific perspectives. In addition, project staff collected information on the weather event, the damage, and recovery statistics from a variety of public and media sources. Key findings and recommendations are as follows:

Key Findings

1. IDHS and its various governmental and nongovernmental partners were proactive in their response and recovery.

2. Under Governor Daniels's leadership, state government adopted a 'customer service' approach to response and recovery operations. The prevailing theme was to help citizens and provide the state with a return to normalcy as quickly as possible.

3. Director Wainscott's decision to empower key IDHS personnel was incisive. This allowed for decision making at the lowest levels, which often provided immediate impact on local situations and events.

4. Dispatching IDHS support teams to assist communities was invaluable. Coupled with the "powering down" of decision making, this allowed for IDHS field personnel to affect situations immediately. This streamlining sped up operations and minimized the layers required for decisions to be made.

5. Establishing the IDHS Joint Information Center was a very effective approach, and facilitated a coordinated media operation and distribution of accurate and timely information.

6. WebEOC worked well to provide a "real time" common operating picture for responders and emergency support functions.

7. The establishment of a "battle rhythm" generally created an effective schedule for reporting, conference calls, updates, and a forum to address problems.

8. Establishing the joint field office helped coordinate recovery efforts.

9. Failure to follow standard operating procedures and protocol had a negative impact on operations at times. The circumvention of the resource request and delivery system created various problems of resource coordination and control.

Recommendations

1. The tracking and recovery of resources was sometimes a problem, and logistics management requires attention.

2. WebEOC must be provided to county emergency management and public safety agencies, and should include training to ensure proficiency.

3. IDHS should consider pushing legislation to support full-time emergency management directors in every Indiana county.

4. Memorandums of understanding should be formalized and honored during emergency operations.

5. IDHS must mandate the implementation and use of request and support protocols, and should continue to "push forward" representatives during emergencies.

6. IDHS should continue to establish "one stop shops" during future response and recovery operations.

7. The mobilization and activation of other state agencies to support IDHS needs to be formalized.

8. Consideration should be given to establishment of permanent office of long term recovery within IDHS.

9. Citizen complacency remains an issue. Renewed efforts must be initiated to prepare citizens to survive up to 72 hours in the event of a disaster event.

10. Training of local responders should be a priority.

11. The issue of pet sheltering should be resolved.

12. At time, the IDHS battle rhythm affected local agencies negatively and is in need of scrutiny.

13. There is a need for off-crisis exercises and training with federal and state agencies.

14. Cross-training efforts within IDHS should be continued.

Introduction

Central and southern Indiana experienced severe weather between May 30, 2008 and June 9, 2008 that included significant rainfall, hail, tornadoes and straight line winds. This series of storms resulted in severe immediate and downstream flooding. These events prompted response and recovery operations by the Indiana Department of Homeland Security (IDHS) and local emergency management agencies. The response and recovery activities for these events have been designated as FEMA disaster #1766.

This document is the after action report (AAR) for that event. Conducted by the Center for Criminal Justice Research (CCJR) within the School of Public and Environmental Affairs (SPEA) at Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), it provides an in-depth analysis of the Indiana Department of Homeland Security's response and recovery activities with particular focus on support to local public safety agencies, first responders, and communities.

The key objective of the AAR is to document the performance of the Indiana Department of Homeland Security, including identifying any strengths and weaknesses, in order to improve performance during future events. The analysis addressed five basic questions:

- What occurred?
- What practices were successful?
- What practices were not successful?
- What circumstances affected success or failure?
- What practices should be retained or amended in future events?

The purpose of the analysis is to improve performance during future events, not to affix blame for any failures. IDHS already has implemented a number of changes as the result of lessons learned from the events of May and June 2008 and the ongoing recovery activities. This report explains the methods used to gather information, as well as the findings and conclusions of CCJR. The report provides basic information about the prompting weather events, a description of methodology, findings, and recommendations. Findings are organized by four areas of activity: Prevention-Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Decision Making.

Methods

The information upon which the analysis is based was collected principally through a series of focus groups with representatives of IDHS, other state and federal agencies, local governments (including public safety personnel and first responders), and non-governmental organizations who participated in response and recovery efforts. The meetings were scheduled and organized by IDHS staff, and facilitated by CCJR staff. Meetings were conducted between August 29th and December 12th, 2008. Individual interviews were conducted in a few cases to fill in missing information or to gain specific perspectives. In each interview, facilitators worked through a series of questions with each group organized around four areas of activity: Prevention-Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Decision Making (Table 1). All told, more than 75 individuals participated (Appendix A), providing a broad range of perspectives regarding various aspects of response and recovery. In addition, project staff collected information on the weather event, the damage, and recovery statistics from a variety of public and media sources.

Table 1: Schedule of Focus Groups and Interviews

Date	Meeting
Friday, August 29, 2008, 1:00 – 4:00 p.m.	Focus group with IDHS and other state agencies - Response
Wednesday, October 15, 2008, 10:00 – 11:30 a.m.	Interview with Shane Booker, Indiana Dept. of Homeland Security
Friday, October 17, 2008, 5:30 – 7:30 p.m.	Focus group with EMA directors (Indianapolis)
Wednesday, October 22, 2008, 9:00 – 10:00 a.m.	Interview with Carlos Garcia, Indiana Dept. of Homeland Security
Thursday, October 23, 2008, 10:00 a.m.- Noon	Focus group with local officials (Seymour)
Monday, November 24, 2008, 8:30-10:30	Focus group with state agencies - Recovery
Friday, December 12, 2008, Noon –2:00 p.m. (local time)	Focus group with local officials (Vincennes)
Friday, January 23, 2008, 8:30 – 9:30 a.m.	Interview with Sherry Seiwert, Indiana Community and Housing Development Authority

Weather Events: May 30, 2008 – June 9, 2008

Central and southern Indiana experienced a series of cascading weather events between May 30, 2008, and June 9, 2008, that included nine tornadoes (Table 2) and a series of thunderstorms that dropped large amounts of rain and caused significant flooding. These events and associated effects have been designated as FEMA disaster #1766 (incident period: May 30, 2008 to June 9, 2008).

The first widespread severe weather outbreak took place across Central Indiana during the late afternoon and evening hours of May 30, 2008. An EF-0 tornado briefly touched down in Carroll County at 7:30 p.m. A second tornado touched down at 10:27 p.m. at 42nd Street and Post Road in Marion County and continued southeast into Hancock County. A third tornado also touched down in northwestern Hancock County at 10:35 p.m. just south of County Road 700 North on County Road 400 West. Additionally, straight line winds caused damage in Henry County.

On June 3, several waves of thunderstorms moved across Central Indiana from morning into evening. Late in the morning a tornado rated EF-1 touched down in Greene and Lawrence counties. In the afternoon an EF-0 tornado touched down near Waverly in Morgan County. In the evening an EF-2 tornado struck Camp Atterbury and Edinburgh in Johnson County. Later in the same evening an EF-3 tornado hit Moscow in Rush County while an EF-1 tornado struck Decatur County near Clarksburg. Rain from the thunderstorms led to flash flooding and increasing levels of stream flow in area rivers.

In the morning of June 4, Bloomfield in Greene County suffered damage from an EF-0 tornado and straight line winds. The accompanying rains resulted in widespread flooding of local streams. A line of severe thunderstorms again moved across parts of Central Indiana during the afternoon of June 6. This line brought winds of approximately 80 mph to parts of the area.

Table 2: May 30 – June 4, 2008 Indiana tornadoes

Date	Counties Affected	Tornado Strength
May 30, 2008	Carroll County	EF-0
May 30, 2008	Marion and Hancock counties	EF-2
May 30, 2008	Hancock County	EF-1
June 3, 2008	Greene and Lawrence counties	EF-1
June 3, 2008	Morgan County	EF-0
June 3, 2008	Brown and Johnson counties	EF-2
June 3, 2008	Shelby and Rush counties	EF-3
June 3, 2008	Decatur County	EF-1
June 4, 2008	Greene County	EF-0

Central Indiana experienced additional thunderstorms with very heavy rain on the evening of June 6 and the morning of June 7. Rainfall amounts between 3 and 11 inches were reported across the affected area (Table 3). Initially, these storms were predicted to pass through the state. Instead, the storm system stalled over Central Indiana, dumping up to 10 inches of rain in some locations.

Table 3: June 6-7 NWS Rainfall Totals*

Rainfall Amount	Location
10.71	Edinburgh
9.85	3 miles south of Paragon
9.80	Spencer
9.50	3 miles east of Center Point (official cooperative observer report)
8.80	Martinsville
7.50	1 mile north of Brazil
7.29	2 miles east of Franklin
6.83	Terre Haute (official ASOS observation)
6.58	Brooklyn
6.37	Mooresville
6.00	2 miles south of Ellettsville
4.00	4 miles west of Plainfield
3.09	7 miles east of Southport

*All amounts are unofficial unless indicated. Source: National Weather Service. *June 2008 Flooding*. http://www.crh.noaa.gov/ind/?n=june0708flood (downloaded 3/3/09)

When this rain event occurred, soils in central and southern Indiana were saturated and stream flows and reservoirs high as the result of a wet spring. As a result, severe flooding occurred within the affected areas on June 7, 8, and 9. By June 9, the National Weather Service had issued 21 flash flood warnings, ten areal flood warnings, and ten river flood warnings and statements. Flooding was particularly severe for the communities in Bartholomew, Greene, Johnson, Morgan, Owen, Vermillion, and Vigo counties. Paragon, Spencer, Franklin, and Martinsville experienced severe flooding early on June 7. As larger streams rose, Edinburgh and Columbus flooded in the afternoon and evening of the 7th. Early on June 8, flooding of the White River and the East Fork of the White River occurred in and around Spencer, Seymour, Worthington, and Newberry. Flood crests continued to travel down the White, East Fork of the White, and Wabash rivers on June 8 and 9. Because of drier conditions further south, the crests dissipated as they moved farther into southern Indiana and into southern Illinois.

Central Indiana was struck by two more rounds of thunderstorms on June 9 with accompanying heavy winds and large hail. Three-quarter inch hail was reported during the afternoon near Martinsville, Indianapolis, Fishers, and Fairland. Winds were estimated at 65 mph at Yorktown in Delaware County and north of Plainfield in Hendricks County. Power lines were downed on the northwest side of Indianapolis, Hamilton, Hendricks, Knox, Marion, and Owen counties reported the flooding of roadways.

Sources

Morlock, S.E., Menke, C.D., Arvin, D.V., and Kim, M.H. 2008. *Flood of June 7-9, in central and southern Indiana: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2008-1322.*

National Weather Service. *May 30 tornadoes and widespread wind damage.* Downloaded March 5, 2009, http://www.crh.noaa.gov/ind/?n=may30_08tor.

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National Weather Service. *June 4 Tornado and flooding.* Downloaded March 5, 2009. http://www.crh.noaa.gov/ind/?n=june04_tor.

National Weather Service. *Waves of storms on June 3 produce 5 tornadoes, wind damage, and flooding.* Downloaded March 5, 2009, http://www.crh.noaa.gov/ind/?n=june03_tor.

National Weather Service. *June 9, 2008 Severe Weather.* Downloaded March 5, 2009. http://www.crh.noaa.gov/ind/?n=june0908svr.

Findings

Findings are provided here, organized by four areas of activity: Prevention–Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Decision Making.

Prevention-Preparedness

The general success of response and recovery activities can be attributed, in part, to proactive emergency response planning by the state of Indiana and local communities. At the time of the May and June 2008 weather events, all Indiana public safety agencies and county emergency management agencies were National Incident Management System (NIMS) compliant. Each had all–hazard plans for severe weather events. All were attentive to the National Response Framework (NRF) and had exercised their respective plans to ensure synchronization with the IDHS and U.S Department of Homeland Security. Focus group participants specifically mentioned the benefit of planning for the response efforts, as the result of Hurricane Katrina and previous flood events in Indiana.

Regular weather monitoring systems were effective in predicting and providing warning of the tornadoes that occurred between May 30 and June 4. During the period leading up to and including May 30, public safety agencies throughout Indiana were tracking weather conditions through the National Weather Service (NWS), the IDHS-provided WebEOC system, or through local media. On May 30, IDHS activated the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as a precautionary measure in anticipation of potential tornadic activity. It should also be noted that on May 30, 2008, the activation of the newly installed outdoor warning system in Marion County was successful and might have been a factor in the minimal number of injuries there. State and local agencies continued to monitor weather conditions in the subsequent days. The state EOC was still activated during this period. When the tornadoes of June 3 struck, the EOC contacted local agencies to offer support. The intensity of the tornadoes was stronger than expected.

Regular weather monitoring systems were not effective in providing warning of the flooding that occurred as a result of the heavy rains of June 6 and 7, catching IDHS and local communities off guard as flooding began. Heavy rains were predicted to pass through the state during the first weekend of June. IDHS and public safety agencies in tornado-stricken areas monitored weather conditions using standard resources as tornado recovery operations continued. As the storm stalled over Indiana, there were no overt warnings or indicators of the potential for flash floods and widespread flooding. Without warnings from external entities, IDHS and local public safety agencies did not anticipate the effects that the sustained heavy rains would have in light of a wetter-than-usual Indiana spring. As a result, the IDHS Emergency Response and Recovery Division self-initiated the call out of IDHS personnel to monitor events and prepare for possible response operations until approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 7. The delayed warnings from regular weather monitoring systems limited the notice provided to communities, particularly those in the northern parts of the affected area.

Early in 2008, IDHS implemented WebEOC as the operating software for the state EOC. The implementation of WebEOC enhanced the capabilities of the state EOC to manage information during a crisis and to provide real-time information sharing between IDHS and local public safety agencies. IDHS utilized WebEOC across the various weather events, to manage internal information and to keep many public safety agencies throughout the state appraised of the potential problems.

Local agencies also reported some difficulties in warning the public, particularly about impending flooding. Rural radio stations often are not staffed on the weekends. Participants expressed frustration because of general difficulties in accessing cable TV communications in order to broadcast warnings and an inability

to tailor warning messages to specific geographic areas. They also indicated that it was hard to convince residents, in areas where it had not rained and flooding was not yet apparent, to evacuate their homes. Local agencies perceived that the system to notify local Emergency Management Agency (EMA) directors to be ineffective. They suggested that notification must be more flexible, particularly on the weekends when EMA directors are out of their offices. IDHS has since implemented new software to address this issue.

Response

Effective response to severe weather events such as disaster #1766 required the involvement of not only IDHS, but other state agencies as well, such as the Indiana State Police, the Indiana Department of Natural Resources, the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, the Department of Animal Health, the Indiana Department of Transportation, and others. Led by IDHS, the state's overall response to #1766 was good.

The mobile command posts deployed by IDHS proved to be an excellent tool. Response to the flooding and ongoing tornado recovery operations rapidly overwhelmed the capabilities of most public safety agencies and communities. Realizing the magnitude of the situation, IDHS dispatched support teams to affected regions of the state to serve as liaisons and facilitate support operations. IDHS was able to utilize district coordinators from unaffected areas of the state as well as personnel from other parts of ISDH who had been cross-trained for emergency management.

There was some disagreement about whether it was appropriate to maintain certain support operations in a fixed location or to move them forward as flood waters progressed south. The sandbagging operations remained in a fixed location. Some indicated that this caused a logistical issue of "pushing" forward sandbags to locations downstate. Others indicated that a fixed location allowed IDHS to produce enough sandbags in a time sensitive situation. Decisions such as these are necessarily event-driven. Moving operations forward, while conceptually desirable, may not always be warranted by weight of circumstances.

Local emergency responders generally were able to contact IDHS about lifesaving information and other related problems. In some cases, telephone service was not available. Initially, some local agencies encountered difficulty in making contact with IDHS. Participants indicated getting busy signals on the 800 MHz radio system. Most of these issues appeared to be due to operator unfamiliarity and overuse of the system for local communications. Agencies quickly resorted to alternative means of communication to overcome any difficulties.

The failure to follow protocol and work with existing pre-established local agreements was periodically an issue, and became frustrating for responders and often negatively affected both response and recovery operations. During initial response operations, memorandums of understanding (MOU) that were in place between local and county public safety agencies were at times ignored or not honored. The failure to honor the MOU's might have been event-driven. In the heat of a crisis, officials reverted in some cases to relying on long-standing personal relationships or connections. It is in these times that adhering to protocol is most critical. WebEOC was not completely implemented at the time of these weather events. State agency staff had not been able to complete training on this new tool prior to the event. Nonetheless, IDHS worked well to adapt during a challenging event in spite of these limitations. The tool itself is extremely user-friendly. It is flexible and easily adaptable. IDHS was able to make a number of minor changes to the system's tools as needed, including adding fields for districts and counties to the mission tasking database.

The state EOC experienced some understaffing during this event. At the time, there was no EOC logistics chief, operations chief, or dedicated IT support. The remaining staff members were able to cover these roles such that the response was not affected in any significant way.

WebEOC had not been adopted universally by counties and municipalities across the response area. IDHS and the local communities were forced to manage multiple methods of communication as a result. Reliable Internet connectivity is essential for WebEOC. In particular, Southern Indiana does not have reliable universal Internet access because of topography and a general lack of hard telecommunications infrastructure. In addition, participants indicated some "push back" about the adoption of WebEOC perhaps due to unfamiliarity. While these barriers are not insurmountable, they must be addressed if WebEOC is to become universal and provide all the potential benefits that a shared information system can provide. In some cases training might eliminate local concerns. Infrastructure issues might be more difficult to surmount.

IDHS and local officials suggested that there were difficulties with tracking resource requests and the location of equipment. In spite of that, IDHS generally was able to be responsive to requests. The most often cited issue was a lack of follow up to resource requests submitted to the IDHS EOC. This failure to "close the loop" was frustrating to local responders. These problems resulted because the EOC did not have staff dedicated to this task and the WebEOC resource tracking tool was not structured to allow staff to find previous requests for assistance or equipment. As the result of this event, IDHS has established a system for assigning unique tracking numbers to each request. Frustration also resulted when local agencies requested resources through local networks. A number of support requests were made through the Indiana Fire Chiefs Mutual Assistance Compact and personal relationships. In some cases, local officials made similar requests to IDHS and through other networks. As a result, IDHS was not always able to fully track requests or resources. This sometimes resulted in the duplication of effort, confusion, and wasted time of personnel at various levels. One telling example occurred in regards to the evacuation of the Columbus Regional Hospital. IDHS was not notified of the decision to evacuate and consequently was unable to divert resources and personnel to assist the effort.

Some conflict occurred between IDHS and local agencies regarding guidance and decision making on resources requested. In some cases, local officials needed guidance on the critical specifications for particular pieces of equipment or resources. In the field, this resulted in the delivery of a piece of equipment or resource that was not immediately accessible without a local adaptation. More experienced directors found such guidance frustrating.

IDHS experienced some difficulties in getting bottled water to areas with disabled public and private drinking water systems. FEMA was not able to deliver these resources in a timely manner, so IDHS made alternate arrangements to secure and deliver water. Rescue efforts were delayed at times as a result of road closures. This was a more significant issue when non–locals were called to respond. During this event, the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), county highway departments, city public works departments, county sheriff departments, and state police were tracking road closures. No central repository of road closures was available, which resulted in delays in response operations. WebEOC is the logical central repository for all road closures during a cataclysmic event.

IDHS established a "battle rhythm" to assist in creating a common operating picture among participating federal, state, and local agencies. The battle rhythm established a sequence of meetings and briefings to regularize information sharing. Local officials expressed some frustration with the battle rhythm. The conference calls established for information sharing between IDHS and local agencies were scheduled at the beginning of EMA directors' shifts when local elected officials often expected local briefings. Officials also complained about the length of the calls. Some indicated feeling uncomfortable spending valuable time listening through a number of issues that were not necessarily applicable locally. This might have been exacerbated by limited staffing at the local level, the enormity of the event, and significant variations in the nature of response activities across the affected region.

IDHS established a Joint Information Center (JIC) adjacent to the EOC. The JIC provided information to the media and established credibility by providing timely updates of the response operations throughout the state. In addition, a liaison from the Governor's office was assigned to the IDHS EOC to facilitate information flow to the Governor.

Significant variations in local emergency management resources affected the ability of local organizations to participate fully in information sharing and other coordinating activities. A number of emergency management director positions across the state are part-time. This limitation makes it difficult to prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from catastrophic events.

The addition of military resources was critical to the evacuation of citizens and the success of sandbagging operations. The Indiana National Guard, along with elements from the Kentucky Air National Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, were instrumental in the success of the tornado and flooding response. All four organization provided air assets and personnel to support the IDHS response operations. Although there was no protocol for the command and control of the Marines and Coast Guard, the leadership of these two entities relied on common sense and their inherent skill sets to work through the unfamiliar territory of working under civilian control. One area of tension was with the rigidity of military protocol and, in some cases, the definition of assignments. The military standard operating procedures do not allow for deviation. This resulted in idle deployed military resources at times.
The provision of shelter support services from the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army was timely. Unfortunately, there were a limited number of qualified shelter managers, perhaps in part due to the extreme magnitude of the event. Sheltering pets, as with Hurricane Katrina, remains a critical, but unresolved issue. Participants in Bartholomew County reported "common sense" prevailed and the shelter manager arranged for the sheltering of pets.

IDHS response operations were widely acclaimed by public safety officials and first responders. One emergency management director said the first person he met after returning from a damage inspection was IDHS Director Joe Wainscott, who immediately inquired as to what he could do to help. The "new" attitude of IDHS was mentioned repeatedly during this inquiry.

Recovery
Recovery operations are still ongoing, although a number of key issues arose during the course of facilitated meetings.

Issues regarding resource coordination and tracking mentioned above also affected the early stages of recovery. In one such example, Columbus officials directly solicited the assistance of the Indiana State Police, outside of IDHS request protocols. This circumvention of protocol created confusion and hampered the deployment of security forces to Columbus.

The establishment of Indiana Office of Disaster Recovery (ODR) was wise and prudent, and allowed IDHS to focus on its return to steady state operations. ODR is an ad hoc organization created by Governor Daniels, similar to the one created by Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour as a result of Hurricane Katrina. ODR is not a permanent operation and will terminate when no longer needed. ODR is tasked with the oversight of recovery operations. After FEMA Disaster #1766, ODR concentrated on helping communities and citizens in their recovery.

IDHS and ODR established a Joint Field Office (JFO) on the north side of Indianapolis. FEMA co-located in the Joint Field Office. This co-location tactic facilitated communication and allowed for interaction and unity of effort to assist citizens.

FEMA was a source of satisfaction and dissatisfaction during recovery operations. Frequent complaints included that FEMA personnel were not empowered to make decisions, decisions were not definitive or consistent, and personnel seemed ill prepared or inexperienced. The FEMA help-line suffered the same problems and often failed to provide solutions to inquiries and consistent responses. Some of these problems may be because; the majority of on-scene personnel were contract employees and not full time FEMA personnel.

Regarding processing claims for assistance, IDHS staff generally were complementary of FEMA's treatment of individual assistance claims. Unfortunately, conflict developed between IDHS and FEMA based upon rules interpretation, particularly around community assistance. IDHS believed FEMA interpreted the recovery rules, especially those regarding funding, far too strictly. This was an ongoing problem and IDHS attempted to work with FEMA to negotiate favorable settlements for communities seeking assistance. Staffing during recovery was a challenge. The magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed the capability of state government. Many state agencies, most notably the Department of Correction (DOC), stepped forward to provide IDHS with additional support personnel. Additionally, IDHS contracted with James Lee Witt and Associates for support personnel to help with recovery operations. The quality of the initial support personnel from other state agencies was less than adequate. Turnover and training were recurring issues as IDHS "ramped up" the recovery effort.

The state of Indiana did not have a unified system of data collection and a central data repository that would provide a complete picture of recovery efforts. As a result, data collection and management regarding recovery efforts was fragmented among a number of different agencies. There was no central repository or standards for data collection. Each state agency had information it believed to be critical, and thus each agency focused on ascertaining and collecting the information it deemed important. This led to a duplication of effort in some instances.

The magnitude of the event overwhelmed the internal financial systems within state government. The system worked, but it was cumbersome and not user friendly. IDHS reported they could turn a claim, once processed, within 72 hours. The impediment was getting the paperwork correctly prepared. Once the application was completed and processed, the payment to the government entity was well within an acceptable timeframe. This appears to be primarily a computer software issue. The state is prepared to function during normal operations, but the recovery demands on the "system" were enormous and taxed not only state employees but the overall administrative system.

Indiana's state leadership engaged all levels of state government in reaction to the tornadoes and floods of late May and early June. For example, a unique and positive decision in the recovery operations was the activation and mobilization of the Indiana Housing and Community Development Authority (IHCDA). While not normally considered to be a part of disaster response or recovery operations, IHCDA was able to develop concepts, procedures, and policies quickly to aid displaced homeowners. IHCDA was able find temporary housing for displaced individuals and families with the help of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), a regular partner, and new partnerships with the Red Cross and Salvation Army. Working with HUD and FEMA they also were able to locate and secure long term provisional housing for those who were displaced by the storms and floods. IHCDA also worked with Indiana University (IU), Indiana State University (ISU), and Vincennes University to establish temporary housing. They received approval from IU and ISU. Further, they sought a moratorium on foreclosures and petitioned the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and HUD to waive income eligibility for federally subsidized single family and multifamily units to allow displaced individuals and families to occupy them.

Two other examples of interagency coordination deserve mention. The decision by the state of Indiana to establish "one-stop shops" during recovery operations proved to be invaluable. This important decision created a lot of good will among responders and affected citizens. In addition, IDHS staff were able to

utilize other federal agencies for assistance, ranging from the Department of Transportation to the National Historic Trust for the first time to provide additional funding to individuals and governments.

The American Red Cross and the Salvation Army were timely in their efforts to assist citizens affected by the disaster. They also are important participants in past and ongoing local emergency management planning. However, the American Red Cross and Salvation Army experienced shortages of qualified shelter managers. This was likely exacerbated by the enormity of the affected area. Shelter management is a common problem across the country.

The sheltering of pets was a problem. The Indiana Department of Natural Resources reported not being able to rescue pets because there were no arrangements to shelter them. Typically, 'common sense' prevailed as the shelter manager arranged for the sheltering of pets. In Bartholomew County, shelter officials were able to craft a separate shelter for pets, but future planning must better address this issue. A number of local planning committees already are working towards solutions for subsequent events. Finally, there were duplicative damage assessments and at times significant disparities in the resulting damage estimates. Damage assessments must be coordinated and consistent. State fire marshal personnel were helpful and brought some continuity to the process.

Decision Making

Governor Daniels was intimately involved in the state's response and recovery operations, sometimes cutting through the bureaucracy of state government to make things happen. Under his leadership, state government adopted a 'customer service' approach to recovery operations. Following Governor Daniel's dictum that everyone should be provided the assistance they needed, all state agencies, state personnel, and contractors went the extra step to ensure Hoosiers were provided assistance. The prevailing theme throughout the response by Indiana state government was to help citizens and provide the state with a return to normalcy as quickly as possible.

Director Joe Wainscott provided clear leadership within IDHS. He empowered Arvin Copeland, the Director of IDHS Emergency Response and Recovery, and Deputy Director Shane Booker, to make decisions. Likewise, IDHS field representatives were authorized to make decisions. This "powering down" of the decision making process streamlined the decision making and allowed IDHS to be responsive to support requests.

In addition, leadership at the local levels aided effective decision making. Leadership at the local level often determines the success or failure of recovery operations. Communities that are proactive are able to obtain community assistance much more quickly. Local knowledge is critical and must be given credence in the decision making process. At the same time, there exist significant variations in resources and experience of personnel across the state. Based on information from the facilitated meetings, some local responders felt slighted by other responding agencies. This was not a criticism, but rather a recognition that in the fog of operations, local officials felt somewhat marginalized in the decision making process. Given the overall enormity and complexity of the event response, operations were being managed on multiple levels. A more inclusive decision making mechanism might have eliminated this issue. Further, all participants were in agreement the tornadoes and floods confirmed the need for experienced personnel. Learning during an event, while doable, is not the best scenario. The need to maintain a well trained response force is paramount and a key to future success. There is no substitute for trained and experienced personnel.

Finally, decision making was made more complex by the large number of governmental and nongovernmental agencies involved, but effective response and recovery still occurred. Response and recovery efforts engaged a variety of federal and state agencies, as well as a number of non-governmental

organizations. These organizations were flexible and generally willing to employ "common sense" to help fellow citizens and hasten the return to normalcy.

Key Findings

1. IDHS and their partners thought outside the box and were proactive in their response and recovery.

2. Under Governor Daniels's leadership, state government adopted a 'customer service' approach to response and recovery operations. The prevailing theme was to help citizens and provide the state with a return to normalcy as quickly as possible

3. Director Wainscott's decision to empower key IDHS personnel was incisive. This allowed for decision making at the lowest levels, which often provided immediate impact on local situations and events. The influence of Director Joe Wainscott on IDHS operations was important and provided the leadership necessary for successful response and recovery.

4. The dispatch of IDHS support teams to assist communities was invaluable. Coupled with the "powering down" of decision making, this allowed for IDHS field personnel to affect situations immediately which otherwise would have required approval by following the request protocols. This streamlining speeds up operations and minimizes the layers typically required for decisions to be made.

5. The institution of the IDHS Joint Information Center was perceptive and facilitated a coordinated media operation and distribution of accurate and timely information.

6. WebEOC is invaluable and provides a "real time" common operating picture to help coordinate all responders and emergency support functions.

7. The establishment of a "battle rhythm" created a schedule for reporting, conference calls, updates, and a forum to address problems.

8. The establishment of the joint field office was invaluable to the coordination of recovery efforts.

9. Failure to follow standard operating procedures and protocol had a negative impact on operations at times. The circumvention of the resource request and delivery system created various problems of resource coordination and control.

Recommendations

Based on information collected for FEMA disaster #1766, CCJR offers the following recommendations to IDHS.

1. Logistics management requires immediate attention. The tracking and recovery of resources was and remains problematic. The misinformation resulting from the failure to follow request protocol is a waste of time and resources.

2. WebEOC must be provided to county emergency management and public safety agencies. This should include a training package to ensure proficiency.

3. IDHS needs to champion legislation to support full-time emergency management directors in every county.

4. Memorandums of understanding must be formalized and honored during emergency operations.

5. IDHS must mandate the implementation and use of request and support protocols.

6. IDHS needs to continue to "push forward" representatives during emergencies.

7. IDHS needs to continue to establish "one stop shops" during future response and recovery operations.

8. The mobilization and activation of other state agencies to support IDHS needs to be formalized.

9. Consideration needs to be given to the establishment of permanent office of long term recovery within IDHS.

10. Citizen complacency is and remains an issue. Most citizens are unprepared for tornadoes, flood, and other cataclysmic events. Renewed efforts must be initiated to prepare citizens to survive up to 72 hours in the event of a disaster event.

11. Training of local responders must be a priority.

12. The issue of pet sheltering must be resolved.

13. Use of the IDHS battle rhythm affected some local agencies negatively and should receive some scrutiny to insure coordination with local jurisdictions.

14. There is a need for off-crisis exercises and training with federal and state agencies.

15. Continue cross-training efforts within IDHS

Appendix A: Focus Group and Interview Participants

August 29, 2008 (Indianapolis, IN—Government Center)

1. Joe Wainscott, IDHS
2. Arvin Copeland, IDHS
3. Shane Booker, IDHS
4. Roger Koelpin, IDHS
5. Randy Collins, IDHS
6. Carlos Garcia, IDHS
7. Jason Hutchins, IDHS
8. Steve Schultz,IDHS
9. Max Michael, IDEM
10. James Greeson, IDHS
11. John Buckman, IDHS
12. Dr. Sandra Norman, Indiana Department of Animal Health
13. LTC Dan Ivey, Indiana National Guard
14. LTC Erin Conn, Indiana National Guard
15. Major Scotty Wilson, Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources
16. First Sargeant Jay Kistler, Indiana State Police

October 15, 2008 (Indianapolis): Shane Booker (IDHS)

October 17, 2008 (Indianapolis, IN—State emergency management conference)

1. Melissa Cundiff, Lake County HS/EMA
2. Joel Richmond, Homeland Security/ Emergency Management
3. Ray Chambers, Newton County EMA
4. Tug Sutton, Johnson County EMA
5. John Grolich, Marshall County LEPL
6. Gene Gray, Marshall County LEPL
7. Randy Collins, IDHS
8. John Hooker, Monroe County EMA
9. Mike Schantz, Shelby Co. EMA
10. David Warren, Hendricks County EMA
11. Rob Puckett, Deputy EMA Rush Co.
12. James Pridgen, Indiana Emergency Resp. Commission
13. Duane Davis, JCEMA
14. Debbi Fletcher, Marion County EMA
15. Jessie Olvera, Marion Co. EMA/Marion
16. Roger Axe, Greene Co. EMA
17. Belinda Haywood, Greene Co. EMA
18. Jim B. Pirtle, Sullivan Co. EMA
19. Bryan Hubard, Clay Co. EMA
20. Jack White, Owen County EMA
21. Fred Griffin, Wayne County EMA

22.   Shane Booker, IDHA
23.   Doug Cooke, IDHS
24.   Joe Romero, IDHS

October 23, 2008 (Seymour, IN)

1.   Shannon Hinton, IDHS
2.   Randy Collins, IDHS
3.   Doug Cooke, IDHS
4.   Mike Garris, Jackson County Highway
5.   Debbie Hackman, Jackson County Solid Waste District
6.   Mayor Craig Luedeman, City of Seymour
7.   Fred Hines, City of Seymour
8.   Brad Lucas, City of Seymour
9.   Andrew Lockman, Brownstown Fire Department
10.   Mary Ellen Anable, Brown County Red Cross
11.   Arann Banks, Jackson County Red Cross
12.   Craig Hages, Seymour Police Department
13.   Duane Davis, Jackson County Emergency Management
14.   Dennis Moats, Bartholomew County Emergency Management
15.   Paul Ramsey, Jackson County Health Department

November 11, 2008 (Indianapolis, IN—Joint Field Office, Castleton)

1.   Andy Miller, ODR, Governor's Office
2.   Larry Bailey (Ctr), IDHS
3.   Rosemary Peterson, SPAO
4.   Carmen Spencer, IDHS – DPAO
5.   Arvin Copeland, IDHS
6.   Larry Cassagne, IDHS
7.   Robert LaGrange, IDHS
8.   Manuela Johnson, IDHS

December 12, 2008 (Evansville, IN)

1.   Terry Hight, IDHS
2.   Paul Goss, Daviess Co EMA
3.   Jerry Sears, IDHS
4.   Tim Smith, Vincennes Twp F.D. (Knox Co)
5.   Jim Bennett, IDHS
6.   John Streeter, Knox County EMA
7.   Terry Hedges, Gibson Co. EMA
8.   Sherman Greer, Evansville/Vanderburgh EMA
9.   Mike Bigler, IDHS
10.   J.D. Kessler, Vigo Co EMA
11.   James Greeson, IDHS

January 23, 2009 (Indianapolis, IN): Sherry Siewert (IHCDA)